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With 150 member countries, and 29 more currently in the process of 
accession, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most important body 
governing international trade. However, there is little theory on how governments 
choose between alternative redistribution policies and no work has been done on the 
role of the WTO in this choice. In this dissertation we develop a theoretical model 
that explains how a particular set of WTO rules, the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM), affect the choice and the level of tariffs and 
subsidies -- two of the most important and frequently observed redistribution policies 
-- in an acceding country. The WTO SCM agreement guides the subsidies that could 
be used by a member country, as well as, provides other members with retaliatory 
measures if these subsidies hurt their interests. We show that, as a country joins the 
WTO, there will be an increase in its tariffs in those sectors that face a threat of 
retaliation against subsidies. Our model also offers a new explanation for why a 
  
country would want to join the WTO. According to our model, the government would 
like to be a part of the organization since that would increase its utility through an 
improved bargaining position vis-à-vis the domestic lobbies. We provide a numerical 
example to illustrate this channel. 
In the second part of the dissertation we test the prediction of our theoretical 
model that the sectors, which after accession face a positive probability of retaliation 
to subsidization, will experience a switch towards tariffs as an alternative instrument 
of income redistribution. Since Countervailing Duties (CVD) are the most frequently 
used measure to retaliate against subsidies, we construct a product level database on 
CVD duties imposed during 1995-2001 by four major users of CVD -- Australia, 
Canada, the EU, and the US -- and use it to test the above prediction of the model for 
the case of China's accession to the WTO in 2001 and Taiwan's accession to the WTO 
in 2002. We use the underlying variation in the way countervailing duties are targeted 
across different industries to derive a proxy for the threat of retaliation faced by 
Chinese (Taiwanese) industries at the time of the country's accession to the WTO. We 
show that in case of both countries accession to the WTO led to a relative increase in 
tariffs for sectors facing a higher threat of retaliation by CVD. We also show that, as 
predicted by the model, the increase in tariffs was larger in sectors with higher costs 
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One of the leading explanations for the existence of trade barriers is that they
are used by the government to redistribute income towards the domestic private
sector. However this explanation is incomplete, as it ignores the question of why
trade barriers are chosen for redistribution when other domestic policies could also
achieve the same goal, and possibly at a lower cost. This dissertation addresses
this question of the choice among alternative policies by looking at production
subsidies and tari¤s two such widely used instruments in practice and how
external commitments imposed on their members by international organizations
can a¤ect that choice. In particular, we analyze the decision of a country to
become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and show how the
WTO rules guiding production subsidies and tari¤s can a¤ect the choice and
the level of these policies used in the acceding country. We also provide a new
explanation for why a country would like to become a member of the WTO and
provide evidence in support of our theoretical model of the impact of these WTO
rules by using Chinas and Taiwans accession to the WTO as case studies.
The dissertation consists of four chapters. The rst chapter provides a brief
overview of the relevant branches of the literature on the choice of redistribu-
tion policy and on the accession to the WTO. We also include a brief outline of
the WTO accession process and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures (SCM), since in our theoretical model we show that the WTO
regulations on subsidies serve as an important commitment device for its mem-
ber governments. Note that according to the WTO accession process member
countries are bound by terms agreed to at the time of accession, which include
the SCM agreement. The SCM agreement denes what constitutes subsidies, lays
down the rules regarding subsidies that can be used by the member countries,
and also guides the retaliatory actions that other members can take against the
1
subsidizing country if subsidies hurt their interests.
The second chapter outlines the theoretical model we use to explain how the
levels of tari¤s and subsidies are decided by taking into account the rules under the
SCM agreement. We show that the government would gain from constraining its
use of subsidies, as doing so improves its bargaining position vis-à-vis the lobbies.
The government would seek membership of the WTO as the threat of retaliation
against subsidies inherent in the SCM agreement makes the governments com-
mitment to not use subsidies more credible. This source of gain to the government
is distinct from what has been argued in the literature and hence provides a new
explanation for why a country would like to join the WTO. We derive conditions
under which the government would gain from joining and provide a numerical
example to illustrate how the proposed channel works.
In Chapter 2 we also show that entry into the WTO increases the incentive
to use an alternative, relatively less e¢ cient form of redistribution policy (tari¤s),
for those products where the governments commitment to not use subsidies is
more credible i.e. in the sectors where the threat of retaliation against subsidies is
higher. This is an important testable prediction since not all subsidies are subject
to automatic retaliation under the SCM agreement, as we explain in Chapter 1.
Furthermore, existing evidence suggests that some products tend to be retaliated
against much more than others, indicating that di¤erent sectors face di¤erent
levels of threat of retaliation.
This result that tari¤s will go up for some products is especially interest-
ing given that the WTO accession is generally associated with a decline in tari¤s.
Whether that is true is in itself debatable, with some recent papers suggesting that
GATT/WTO membership does not result in lower trade barriers (Rose (2004b)).
However, there are special features of the WTO rules (SCM) that have the oppo-
site e¤ect, and, according to our model, it is precisely these features that determine
2
the governments desire to join the WTO.
In Chapter 3 we empirically test the above prediction of the model that tari¤s
will come to be used as a tool for redistribution in those sectors that face a threat
of retaliation against subsidy. We test this hypothesis using Chinas accession to
the WTO in December 2001 as a case study. One of the most important vari-
ables needed to conduct this exercise is a measure of Chinas perceived threat
of retaliation against Chinese subsidies by other members. Since according to
the SCM agreement, Countervailing Duties (CVD) are one of the main instru-
ments that member countries can use against the subsidizing country, we derive
the measure of threat of retaliation using data on past CVD duties used by the
members. Hence, to this end, we construct a novel dataset on CVD duties used
by four majors users of CVDs Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US (that
together account for approximately fty percent of Chinas trade) against all
other members of the WTO between 1995 and 2001 i.e. since the inception of the
WTO to the accession of China to the WTO.
Note that, according to several scholars, the primary role of the CVD is to
act as a deterrent against unfairsubsidy practices of the member governments.
Along these lines Hoekman & Kostecki (1995) note, "...There are two possible ra-
tionales for responding to foreign subsidies [via CVD]. The rst [rationale], to
o¤set injurious e¤ects of such policies on domestic industries, ...has little eco-
nomic merit. [Instead] the argument that [the CVD is used to restrict] imports of
products that have beneted from unfair government assistance, ..as a means of
inhibiting the use of such measures, has greater economic merit..." (page 332).1
The results in Chapter 3 show that there was a relative increase in Chinas
tari¤s, as it acceded to the WTO, for sectors that faced a positive probability of
getting retaliated against. This adverse impact on tari¤s is not only statistically
1 [] and commas added. Also see Deardor¤ & Stern (1987).
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but also economically signicant. According to our most conservative estimates,
as China entered the WTO there was a relative increase in its tari¤s of at least
0.5 percentage points, or of about 9%, for those products that faced a threat
of retaliation against subsidies compared to those that did not. We also nd
that, consistent with the theoretical model, the impact of the threat of retaliation
was higher for those sectors that faced a greater cost due to retaliation. In fact,
according to our estimates, while for those sectors that did not face a threat of
retaliation a 1% increase in exports would lead to a 1.2% decrease in tari¤s, the
same 1% increase in exports would result in a 3% increase in tari¤s for sectors
that faced a threat of retaliation.
In order to test the validity of our results we perform several sensitivity and
robustness exercises. We show that these results are robust to alternative speci-
cations, sample sizes and outliers. In one of the more interesting counterfactual
exercises to conrm that the results are indeed due to the threat of retaliation
and not to some underlying unobservables, we show that we do not get the same
results if we use the sample years before China entered the WTO i.e. before it
faced the threat of retaliation.
While the robustness of these results and the counterfactual exercises show
that our main hypothesis is supported by the data, some questions still remain
unanswered. Are these empirical results specic to China or can they be gener-
alized to other countries? The theoretical model assumes a small country, while
China is a large country according to most measures, so should we expect to nd
similar results in the case of a small country? The fourth chapter attempts to
answer these questions by using the case of Taiwans accession to the WTO to
test the hypothesis of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2. The case
of Taiwan is especially interesting since Taiwan acceded to the WTO in January
2002, around the same time China did, hence making the timing of the two studies
4
comparable.
Looking at the case of Taiwan we again nd support for our hypothesis that
there was a relative increase in its tari¤s for those sectors that faced a threat of
retaliation against subsidies compared to the sectors that did not. The threat of
retaliation in the case of Taiwan seems to have been even more signicant owing
to the fact that Taiwan was a relatively free economy even before acceding to the
WTO. Our estimates indicate that, as Taiwan entered the WTO, the threat of
retaliation led to a relative increase in its tari¤s of about 1 percentage point or
about 65% for those products that faced retaliation. We also nd similar results
for the counterfactual exercise: the threat of retaliation was not important in the
period before Taiwan entered the WTO.
This dissertation contributes to the literature in many ways. First, it provides a
model that explains the equilibrium level of tari¤s and production subsidies chosen
by the WTOmembers and non-members in the presence of special interest groups.
Thus, it contributes to the literature on the political economy of trade policy that
seeks to explain the existence of trade barriers as a result of a politically-motivated
government that trades policy favors in exchange for contributions from special
interest groups. Second, this model can explain why the government would want
to chose a relatively ine¢ cient policy such as a tari¤, to achieve the same goal that
could be met through a less distortionary policy, production subsidy. Hence, it
shows a new motive for the government to join the WTO: as a commitment device
that makes subsidies costly, thereby improving its bargaining position vis-à-vis the
lobbies and hence increasing its own utility.
Third, by looking at the case of Chinas and Taiwans accession to the WTO,
and nding that the threat of retaliation on subsidies has an impact on the level
of tari¤s in the acceding country, this dissertation contributes to two branches of
empirical literature. First, since the threat of retaliation is against subsidies, which
5
in turn a¤ects the level of tari¤s, this study is one of the few empirical studies
to show a link between these two important policies. Second, this dissertation
also contributes to a relatively small but growing literature that tries to nd the
impact of the WTO membership on member countries.
While the evidence in the literature is mixed, with some studies concluding
that the accession to the WTO does not have an impact on a members trade
policy, we show that there is convincing evidence of an impact once we take
into account the specic rules more carefully and go beyond the aggregated data
typically employed. Showing that the WTO SCM rules hinder tari¤ liberalization
is especially important and timely given the fact that the WTO World Trade
Report (2006), which focuses on subsidies and the associated role by the WTO,
recognizes the importance of this question but admits that there are no existing
studies with evidence to this e¤ect so far.
Apart from the above contributions, as with any new topic of research, this dis-
sertation also raises a number of interesting and exciting questions to be pursued
in future work which we discuss in the conclusion of each chapter.
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CHAPTER 1
1 Literature Review, WTO Accession and SCM
Rules
1.1 Introduction
Despite a considerable decline in trade barriers in the past fty years, there still
exist signicant barriers to trade across the world. This is especially puzzling given
the fact that, once we take the retaliation by the trade partners into account, these
tari¤ barriers are typically welfare reducing even for the large countries. This
puzzle of the existence of tari¤ barriers has been explained by several political
economy models as a natural outcome when the policy maker places di¤erent
weights on the welfare of di¤erent groups in society.
However, this explanation for tari¤s raises a puzzle of its own: if the objective
is to favor a particular group, then why use trade policy, a relatively ine¢ cient
instrument, to meet this goal. In fact, as pointed out by Rodrik (1995), the
entire political economy literature of trade policy actually is a literature of re-
distribution (page 1470). Thus according to him the yet unresolved puzzle is
why we see ine¢ cient redistribution policies being used in the equilibrium. In
Grossman & Helpman (1994), one of the most prominent political economy mod-
els of trade policy, this outcome arises because the government is constrained to
have access only to trade policies. In fact Dixit, Grossman & Helpman (1997)
show that once we allow government access to e¢ cient policies to transfer re-
sources, in addition to the ine¢ cient ones, we will see only the e¢ cient policies
being used in equilibrium.2
2 The paper describes how interactions among lobbies give rise to a prisoners dilemma in
which the more e¢ cient policy is used, but the lobbies are worse o¤, and hence, ine¢ cient
7
In this dissertation we present a model to explain the choice between tari¤s and
subsidies and we show how the WTO accession a¤ects this choice. In this chapter
we provide the necessary information to motivate our theoretical and empirical
strategies adopted in subsequent chapters. The rest of the chapter is structured
as follows. In Section 1.2, we review two existing branches of literature that this
dissertation brings together: the literature on the choice of redistribution policies
especially in the context of the trade policies, and the literature discussing some
of the reasons why countries join the WTO. Section 1.3 briey describes the WTO
accession process and Section 1.4 presents the rules that guide subsidies.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Redistribution Policies
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a puzzle in the trade policy
literature is why tari¤s are used for redistribution, when the same goal can be
achieved through a more e¢ cient instrument such as production subsidies? A
number of theoretical explanations have been given in order to resolve this puzzle
and they typically fall in one of two categories. The rst branch of literature,
while maintaining the traditional benevolent role of the government, explains this
puzzle by arguing that the ranking of various alternative policies themselves might
get reversed under di¤erent circumstances.
In the early literature the traditional view was that, in the absence of any
market power, direct instruments (production subsidies) are better than trade
policy (e.g. tari¤) to redistribute income (Bhagwati & Ramaswami (1963)). How-
ever, Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1980) and Krueger (1974) show that in presence
of rent seeking behavior (Directly Unproductive Activities), the welfare ranking
of subsidies and tari¤s might get reversed even in a small economy. Similarly,
policies can arise if the lobbies can coordinate their actions.
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Rodrik (1986) argues that allowing for endogenous policy making would lead to a
perverse welfare ranking given the rm-specic nature of subsidies.3 Thus, these
arguments posit that the policy maker is a benevolent agent who chooses the best
instrument available for the task, though the ranking of instruments might itself
be di¤erent (See Becker (1983)).
Another branch of literature, on the other hand, maintains the "traditional"
ordering of policy instruments, but argues that ine¢ cient policy would exist
in equilibrium due to the strategic choice made by the players. For example,
Coate & Morris (1995), formalizing the idea put forward by Tullock (1983), ar-
gue that government might use relatively ine¢ cient instruments as a means of
disguised transfer to special interest groups in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation. They note, however, that this explanation requires asymmetric informa-
tion about both the type of the politician as well as the e¤ect of the policies and,
hence, can not be used to explain the existence of tari¤s.
A separate argument is made by Staiger & Tabellini (1987), who show that
tari¤s might be preferred by the government over subsidies as a result of the
governments inability to commit to a future policy. They explore the case of
a small open economy where the government has an incentive to redistribute
income in the face of a terms of trade shock. They show that, if the government
is restricted to using time-consistent policies, it may rationally choose a regime
where only tari¤s are used and no subsidies.
In the Staiger & Tabellini (1987) framework protection arises due to redistri-
bution concerns and not due to lobbying pressures. On the other hand, in their
"protection for sale" model, Grossman & Helpman (1994) argue that, in the pres-
ence of intense lobby competition, lobbies themselves would prefer the ine¢ cient
3 A similar argument is made by Mitra (2000) in the context of lobbying and the free rider
problems associated with tari¤s, though in his model it is the capitalists, who favor tari¤s over
subsidies.
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instrument, i.e. the tari¤s over subsidies. According to this model the govern-
ment is a self-interested agent, who values both general welfare and contributions
from special interest groups. These special interest groups in turn provide the
government with contributions in exchange for protection. Since, due to intense
competition among lobbies, their e¤orts cancel out, but they have to pay higher
contributions in the presence of subsidies, lobbies would prefer a political regime
that only allows for tari¤s.
Inherent in all this discussion about the choice of di¤erent instruments is the
notion of these instruments being substitutes. However, as most of the above
explanations predict only one instrument being used in equilibrium, the question
of why both instruments are used, and more importantly, what is the e¤ect of
change in one policy on the other, remains.
In a recent paper, Drazen & Limão (2004) provide another explanation for
why we see an ine¢ cient instrument being used in equilibrium and show that
in equilibrium e¢ cient and ine¢ cient policies may coexist. They consider the
choice between lump-sum transfers and subsidies, as redistribution instruments,
and show how the government would like to restrict the lump-sum transfer to
improve its own welfare. The main idea in that paper is that the government
might want to put a binding cap on the lump-sum transfers as that leads to an
improvement in its bargaining position relative to the lobbies. Thus, while the size
of the surplus is smaller, the increased bargaining position gives the government
an ability to extract a larger fraction of the surplus. Furthermore, they show
that, as in equilibrium there remains an opportunity to extract further surplus,
we would see relatively less e¢ cient instrument also being used. In chapter 2 of
this dissertation we extend the model in Drazen & Limão (2004) to the choice
between tari¤s and production subsidies and to the context of accession to the
WTO.
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Empirical studies relating two instruments are even more scarce. One of the
earlier papers to explicitly take the e¤ect of one instrument over another in to
account was Ray (1981). While trying to estimate the determinants of tari¤ and
non-tari¤ barriers (NTBs) in the US, Ray (1981) used tari¤s as an explanatory
variable in the NTB equation along with other variables. He found a positive
and signicant e¤ect of tari¤ on NTB in each of the specications of NTBs that
he used.4 Thus, he observed that "...while it is not clear if the high non tari¤
barriers were the result of a tari¤ ceiling, or not, what is clear is that the same
industries which are able to obtain high rate of tari¤ protection also get high non
tari¤ barriers...".
There are two recent papers by Mitra, Thomakos & Ulubasoglu (2004) and
Ederington & Minier (2006) that try to empirically test the choice between tari¤s
and subsidies.5 The paper by Ederington and Minier uses cross-country data to
explain the determinants of choice of policies at the aggregate level. On the other
hand, Mitra et. al. study the choice of protection (tari¤s) versus promotion (sub-
sidies) using industry data in Turkey. This paper derives two separate estimating
equations based on the Grossman & Helpman (1994) framework. In one case they
constrain the government to have access to only tari¤s while in the other case they
limit the governments access to only production subsidies. Then they use the ra-
tio of predictions from these di¤erent specications to test determinants of the
policy mix. However, doing so misses any interaction between the two policies by
assumption and they themselves note the limitation of their theoretical model.6
4 He also checked the sequential ordering of tari¤ vs non tari¤ barriers and concluded that,
while tari¤s were important in determing NTBs, the reverse was not true.
5 In another paper Ederington & Minier (2005) point out that papers esti-
mating Grossman & Helpman (1994) are biased as they exclude domestic policies.
Ederington & Minier (2005) derive expressions by including production subsidy in the
Grossman & Helpman (1994) framework and use it to test the resulting predictions. However,
in their empirical part, they focus on explaining total protection (subsidies+tari¤s) and not on
the choice between subsidies and tari¤s.
6 Mitra, Thomakos & Ulubasoglu (2004) notes that, "...introducing both trade taxes and
subsidies and output taxes and subsidies in the same model can lead to a corner solution in
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In our theoretical model the government has access to both tari¤s and subsidies,
and we show how threat of retaliation against subsidies a¤ects the level of tari¤s
both theoretically and empirically.
1.2.2 WTO Accession
The General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) was founded in 1947, after
the end of the second world war, as an interim agreement between 23 contracting
parties (see Hoekman & Kostecki (1995)). While several countries and custom
territories had become a member of GATT since then, it was not until January
1995 that the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established as an interna-
tional organization with a formal institutional structure.7 Since then 22 countries
have acceded to the WTO, Vietnam being the latest member to join on 11th Jan-
uary 2007. Vietnams accession brought the total membership of WTO to 150
countries, while 29 more countries are currently in the process of accession.
There are two main lines of argument as to why a country would like to
join the WTO. One branch of literature highlights the terms-of-trade reasons
for joining the WTO, while the other suggests commitment reasons. According
to the terms-of-trade motive (highlighted by Bagwell & Staiger (1999), (2002)),
countries would like to be a part of these agreements since they provide a way to
escape from the prisoners dilemma associated with unilateral liberalization. These
papers emphasize the fact that a country that has some market power could gain
from imposing tari¤s as it improves the countrys terms-of-trade by reducing the
foreign export price. Since the cost of tari¤ protection is partly shared by the
foreign country, the unilateral equilibrium involves greater protection for each
which only one type of policy instrument is used... Developing a model, ...[to explain both being
used simultaneously, is] ...clearly beyond the scope of this paper which we view primarily as an
empirical contribution to the literature." [ ] Added
7 For an excellent book length treatment of the GATT/WTO as an institution and its rules
see Hoekman & Kostecki (1995), (2001).
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country making everyone worse o¤. Hence, the reciprocal liberalization inherent
in the GATT/WTO agreement can increase welfare for every country.
In a recent paper Broda, Limão & Weinstein (2006) provide evidence that
countries use their market power in setting trade barriers. In our model we as-
sume a small open economy that is unable to inuence the world price, hence, the
terms-of-trade motive for trade agreement highlighted here does not apply.
The other group of papers focuses on the interaction between the government
and domestic residents and emphasizes the commitment role of the trade agree-
ments. Along these lines, Staiger & Tabellini (1987) argue that, in the presence
of redistribution concerns following terms of trade shocks, the government would
like to surprise workers with protection. However, since workers can not be sys-
tematically surprised, this leads to a time consistent but suboptimal equilibrium
with excessive protection. Hence, the role of the GATT/WTO is to provide the
government with a credible commitment mechanism through which it can achieve
the optimal equilibrium.
A second channel through which the WTO provides the government of a small
country with a commitment mechanism with respect to its domestic residents is
highlighted by Maggi & Rodríguez-Clare (1998).8 They show that, if capital is
xed in the short run but mobile in the long run, a politically motivated gov-
ernment with low bargaining power vis-a-vis the domestic lobbies might benet
from joining the trade agreement that leads to free trade. In their model this
result arises because, while the government gains in the short-run from the contri-
butions provided by domestic lobbies in exchange for protection, that leads to a
resource misallocation in which the capital moves to the protected sector. Hence,
the government would want to "tie its hands" by joining these agreements, as
otherwise the short-run gains might be more than o¤set by the long-run losses
8 In a recent paper Maggi & Rodríguez-Clare (forthcoming) extend this framework to the
case of a large country.
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due to excessive investment in the protected sector.9
In this dissertation we highlight the role of the WTO as a commitment mech-
anism that is distinct from all these channels previously explored in the litera-
ture. In our model there is no time-inconsistency problem as the one outlined in
Staiger & Tabellini (1987), nor is there any divergence between short and long-
term objectives of the government as in Maggi & Rodríguez-Clare (1998). We
also do not assume capital to be mobile across sectors. Instead, we highlight
the role of the threat of retaliation against subsidies under the SCM agreement
(explained below) as providing the commitment mechanism by which the WTO
helps the government restrict its use of subsidies. More importantly, all the above
papers highlight the role of the WTO in decreasing the level of tari¤s. In contrast,
according to our model tari¤s will increase in precisely those sectors where the
WTO subsidy rules provide a commitment role.
The empirical literature on the role of the GATT/WTO as a commitment
mechanism is even more limited. In one of the rst attempts to examine the
role of GATT/WTO as a commitment device, Staiger & Tabellini (1999) study
the tari¤ exclusions provided by the US government to certain sectors under the
Tokyo round and under the GATTs escape clause. According to their empirical
strategy, they expect the exclusion decisions associated with the Tokyo round to
be negatively associated with the underlying production distortions, but those
associated with the GATT escape clause to be positively associated if the GATT
rules are used as a commitment device. Their results are mixed, but provide some
support for the commitment role of the GATT/WTO.
In a recent paper, Bown (2004) tries to investigate the source of the commit-
ment ability provided by the GATT/WTO. He looks at the dispute settlement
9 Mitra (2002) shows that if there are xed costs of lobby formation, the government with
low bargaining power with respect to the lobbies would commit to a free trade agreement, even
in the absence of inter-sectoral mobility.
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data for 1973-98 in an attempt to identify the economic and institutional determi-
nants of the commitment power provided by GATT. He shows that it is the threat
of retaliation of the trading partner that provides the government with the com-
mitment ability to commit to tari¤ liberalization. This result is consistent with
the theoretical and the empirical approach in our study that the governments
commitment power is derived from the threat of retaliation provided under the
WTO rules. However, there is an important di¤erence: in contrast to the channel
in Bown (2004), in our study the threat of retaliation is against subsidies which
in turn leads to an increase in tari¤s.
1.3 WTO Accession Process
Despite WTOs claiming a total membership of 150 countries, there is little guid-
ance in terms of the specic rules to be followed during the process of GATT (and
now WTO) accession. In fact, the WTO Article XII that guides the process of ac-
cession is remarkably brief, mentioning only that accession is to take place on the
"terms to be agreed" between WTO members and the Applicant (WTO (2005)).
While this lack of guidance in the WTO rules regarding the accession process
implies that each case is unique in terms of its details and the total time involved,
the steps of accession have followed an established pattern evolved over time and
are outlined in a note drafted by the WTO Secretariat (Lanoszka (2001)).10
The process of accession to the WTO starts when a country or a customs
territory submits an application to the General Council for membership. The
General Council then establishes a working party consisting of all interested par-
ties to guide the accession process. The applicant country submits a memorandum
about its foreign trade regime including relevant statistical information, as well
10 For instance, the accession process of Kyrgyz Republic was completed in only 2 years and
10 months, while that of China took a total of 15 years and 5 months, since its application for
membership.
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as information about existing legislation. The working party members examine
the memorandum and may ask questions to assess the conformity of the trade
regime of the applicant with the WTO rules by establishing a fact nding com-
mittee. This is followed (accompanied) by the bilateral (plurilateral) negotiations
between the applicant and interested members. During the bilateral negotiations
the negotiations over market access largely take place over the trade policy of the
applicant, while the benet to the applicant is that it gets MFN treatment from
the member countries.11
Thus, as we can see, the WTO negotiation process does not provide an explicit
set of rules regarding the level of tari¤s, which are to be determined according to
the negotiations between the acceding country and the interested existing WTO
members. We use this relative exibility of the government in choosing tari¤s in
our theoretical model.
While the applicants market access commitments on goods and services (such
as levels of tari¤s) are a result of bilateral negotiations, according to the GATT-
94 undertaking, the multilateral rules agreed to in the WTO are applicable to
all members and hence apply to the applicant at the date of accession.12 In this
respect the WTO (GATT-94 undertaking) is di¤erent from original GATT-47 in
that under the original GATT treaty countries were free to choose if they wanted
to become a party to a given agreement. One such agreement that is binding to
all members on the date of accession, and is central to our work, is the one that
guides subsidies and the legal actions available against subsidizing members the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) which we describe
in more detail in the next section.
11 Note that, according to Article XIII any member can opt out of being a party to the
agreement with an applicant at the time of its accession. However, this decision can only be
made before accession.
12 The exact details of the rules and the transition period can be negotiated during the
accession process, however there is no xed rule that allows for the transition period.
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Once the country has nished the bilateral negotiations, the nal outcome is
summarized in a Schedule of Accession. At the same time the Working Party
submits its report and the Protocol of Accession. These documents form the nal
"accession package" with which the applicant can become a member once the
General Council approves with a two thirds majority, subject to ratication by
the national parliament of the applicant country.
1.4 Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) denes
subsidies and describes a set of rules that discipline both the use of subsidies
and the actions that other members can take against subsidies. Any nancial
contribution from the government, or its agent, in the form of a direct transfer or
grant, or acts which unfairly decrease the costs of domestic producers by providing
incentives such as low interest loans, low priced raw materials or inputs such as
water or electricity, or forgoing tax revenues etc. are considered to be subsidies in
the sense of this agreement.13
According to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, there
are two main categories of subsidies: prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies.
Subsidies that are based on export performance or encourage use of domestic goods
over imports fall into the category of prohibited subsidies. The second category
actionable subsidies  refers to those specic subsidies that adversely a¤ect
or cause injury to the domestic industry of any member government.14 A third
category called non-actionable subsidies was also originally classied under this
13 Thus the WTO agreement gives a more precise denition of subsidy than the original
Tokyo round subsidy agreement under GATT. However, there still is considerable ambiguity in
the wording of the agreement, and the way it is interpreted by member countries. This ambiguity
is evident from the discussions of members and can be seen from WTO reports involving several
dispute settlement cases.
14 Specic subsidies are the subsidies which target a particular industry or group of rms,
either de jure or de facto.
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agreement. Subsidies that either were non-specic or that were given for R&D or
regional development were listed in this category. However, this third category
expired on 31st December,1999 and has not been extended.15,16
Classifying subsidies into di¤erent categories as prohibited and actionable
points to the fact that a government is free to use actionable subsidies to pur-
sue its own industrial policy as long as they do not hurt the interests of another
member nation.17 Thus, the WTO does not prohibit all forms of subsidies, nor
does it imply that all subsidies will lead to automatic retaliation. Hence, in our
theoretical model we allow for production subsidies to be used. However, as given
in the SCM rules, we also include the possibility of retaliation by other WTO
members.18
The SCM rules allow for two courses of retaliatory actions that member gov-
ernments can take if they are hurt (or threatened) by the subsidies provided by
a member. Subsidies are thought as hurting another members interests if they
hurt the domestic industry of "like products" in the complaining country, lead
to a displacement of complaining members exports to the subsidizing country,
or cause displacement of its exports in a third country. Hence, we see that the
WTO rules allow for retaliation against subsidies given to both import competing
as well as the exporting sectors.
According to the SCM rules if the bilateral negotiations between the subsidiz-
ing country and another country which is hurt by the subsidies fails, the members
15 (Source: Legal texts - Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Understanding
the WTO) http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm#subsidies)
16 Note that even when the third category (non-actionable subsidies) existed, member gov-
ernments could le a complain with the WTOs dispute settlement panel if, an otherwise non-
actionable subsidy was seriously a¤ecting its interests.
17 According to Juris international, a database on international trade laws, "...The SCM
Agreement recognizes that governments utilize subsidies to attain various policy objectives.
However, it restrains the right of governments to grant subsidies that have signicant trade-
distorting e¤ects. Its rules are complex..." http://www.jurisint.org/pub/06/en/doc/C08.pdf
18 Also note that, while the WTO rules are the same for all sectors in any acceding country, it
is the a priori di¤erence in the threat of retaliation by other members, that helps us in identifying
the di¤erent commitment ability of the government across sectors.
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can complain against the subsidizing member in the WTOs Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). Alternatively, member governments are allowed to unilaterally re-
taliate against the subsidizing member by imposing a countervailing duty on the
subsidized imports if the subsidy hurts their interests. Note that, the WTO also
provides for dispute settlement mechanisms, which a member government could
resort to if it believes that it has been treated unfairly by another member, or
if it believes that its trading partners actions are not consistent with the SCM
rules.19 Hence, these rules put a lot of discipline on a member countrys use of
subsidies, as well as the retaliatory actions available to its trading partners.
According to article XXV of the SCM agreement, every three years WTO
members are required to submit comprehensive notications of all subsidies given
on goods and services, with annual updates for the intervening years. These no-
tications should include information about the volume of the subsidy, the policy
objective, the intended length of the subsidy program, as well as the relevant
statistics that can help identify the impact of the respective subsidy on trade
(Hoekman & Kostecki (1995)). Members are also required to notify the WTO
about their CVD laws, as well as submit semi-annual notications of any CVD
actions taken during the reporting period. While these notications are some-
times patchy, they can serve as a principle source of information against harmful
subsidies provided by any WTO member.
Note that, other members may cross-notify subsidies if these are not reported
by the member country that engages in subsidization. In fact, in its 1999 report
19 According to the SCM rules, in order for a member country to impose a countervailing duty,
it needs to show both the existence of a subsidy and the resulting injury to its domestic industry
(Hoekman & Kostecki (2001)). Thus, not only is it required to show that the subsidy exists,
and that the domestic industry is hurt, but also to establish a causal link between injury and
subsidies. However, in cases when the ad valorem subsidy is above a certain level (5 percent),
the burden of proof that the subsidies have not harmed the complaining party lies with the
subsidizing member. On the other hand, if ad valorem subsidy is below the threshold level of
one percent (two or three percent for developing countries) it will be considered de minimus and
no countervailing duties can be imposed.
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to Congress, the US Department of Commerce notes that "...These subsidy no-
tications have played an important role in the United Statesmonitoring and
enforcement activities to protect U.S. rights and benets under the Subsidies
Agreement...".20 The report also notes that the US carries out extensive reviews
of other members notications to identify unreported subsidies. Hence, these
measures can lead to an increased transparency and a means to ensure compli-
ance with the SCM agreement.
Thus, to conclude, the rules regarding tari¤s in the WTO accession process
are exible and are open to negotiations, whereas the subsidy rules are xed and
become binding to every member on the date of accession. We make use of this
di¤erence in the WTO rules regarding tari¤s and subsidies, among other insights






The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most important body governing
international trade in goods and services. It currently has 150 member coun-
tries that account for more than 95 percent of the world trade, while around
29 countries are currently in the process of accession. Hence, the interest re-
garding WTO rules and functioning has grown at a tremendous pace, both in
academic circles and outside. However, there is no consensus in the literature
about how the membership in the GATT/WTO a¤ects the volume of trade
or the trade policies of member countries. While some papers suggest no ef-
fect of membership on the trade volume (Rose (2004a)) or trade policy of the
member countries (Rose (2004b)), others (Subramanian & Wei (forthcoming) and
Tomz, Goldstein & Rivers (forthcoming)) view it as having a positive and signif-
icant e¤ect on the volume of trade.
Despite its importance, and the growing interest in the functioning of the
WTO, it is surprising that the existing literature is relatively scant on the issues
of how the WTO rules might a¤ect the decision by a prospective applicant to
join the organization, and the impact that they may have on trade and domestic
policies of the acceding country. In this chapter we focus on one particular set
of WTO rules, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM),
which are binding to all members at the date of accession, and show how these
rules a¤ect the level and choice of redistribution policies used by the government.21
21 Thus, in the following, we will use the terms "the decision to join the WTO" and "the deci-
sion to join the agreement on subsidies and countervailing duties" (the rule governing subsidies
and countermeasures) interchangeably.
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In particular, we show that as the country joins the WTO there will be an increase
in its tari¤s for those products that face a threat of retaliation against subsidies
as provided in the WTO rules. This is an interesting result as WTO accession
is generally associated with a decrease in tari¤s. Interestingly, we show that it is
precisely these e¤ects that lead a country to seek accession to the WTO.
In particular, we identify a new reason for the government to want to join
the WTO, previously unexplored in the literature. In our model the government
might gain from joining the WTO, by credibly committing to lowering subsidies,
as this improves its bargaining position vis-à-vis the domestic lobbies. Identify-
ing this gain from joining the WTO, due to increased commitment power, can
explain why countries join the WTO even in the face of "increasing costs".22
This is even more important given the fact that recently several observers have
noted that the welfare gains to the acceding country due to tari¤ liberalization
associated with joining the WTO (the usual explanation given for why countries
would join the WTO) are often not big (at least in the short-run). For example,
Rumbaugh & Blancher (2004) note "...Most models show that the overall welfare
e¤ects of WTO-induced tari¤ changes in China.. are not sizable, since ..Chinas
tari¤s have already been lowered substantially..." (page 12). Similarly, in a state-
ment to the House Ways and Means Committee, Nicholas Lardy noted that the
benets to China from joining the WTO are limited as it had already received a
permanent MFN status from all major countries except the United States even
before applying for the WTO membership.23
22 In addition to the costs involved with restructuring the economy to bring it in con-
formity with the WTO rules, several papers have noted that the cost of joining the WTO
has been rising as the new members are forced to undertake additional commitments (WTO
plus) that go beyond those in the WTO rules (see for example, Evenett & Primo Braga (2005),
Langhammer & Lucke (1999)).
23 In his September 1996 statement to the House Ways and Means Committee, Nicholas
Lardy notes, "..the benets China would attain through WTO membership are relatively mod-
est. Chinas size and geopolitical inuence are both su¢ ciently large that the single most impor-
tant economic benet associated with membership in the WTOpermanent most-favored-nation
(MFN) trading status in the markets of member countrieswas bestowed by all countries, except
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This chapter contributes to two separate, though related, branches of liter-
ature.24 The rst deals with the political economy of trade policy, while the
second examines the incentives to join a multilateral organization such as the
GATT/WTO. According to a large group of papers that seek to explain the ex-
istence of trade barriers such as tari¤s, these barriers are the result of optimizing
behavior by policy makers who act in their own interest. The main message of
this branch of literature is that trade policy is a means to redistribute income
towards certain groups in the economy. For instance, in their widely cited paper,
"Protection for Sale", Grossman & Helpman (1994) argue that trade barriers are
the equilibrium outcome of negotiations between a politically motivated govern-
ment and organized interest groups (lobbies) when the incumbent government also
values contributions from the lobbies in addition to social welfare.25
A drawback of most of the papers in this body of literature is that they rule
out instruments for income redistribution other than tari¤s by assumption, even
though many, possibly more e¢ cient, instruments exist in practice (Rodrik (1995)).
Although some arguments about when and why one instrument or another should
be preferred exist in the literature, Rodrik (1995) views them as being "too spe-
cic" and "often an afterthought". This issue was addressed in a recent paper
by Drazen & Limão (2004), who argue that the ine¢ cient policies might arise in
the United States, in advance of even any indication on Chinas part that it was interested in
participating in the GATT system. And the United States has provided MFN status for China
on a year-by year basis for more than fteen years. With the principal benet of membership
already in hand, what is the incentive for China to incur the considerable costs of domestic re-
structuring and adjustment that would inevitably accompany the dismantling of their remaining
import barriers? In short, the costs of conforming to expectations of the West on openness to
trade are relatively high for China while the gains from membership in the GATT/WTO are
relatively small...." (STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
Hearings on Accession of China and Taiwan to the World Trade Organization By Nicholas
R. Lardy Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Accessed http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/chinwto1.htm)
24 Here we highlight the relevent literature briey. We provide a more comprehensive review
in Chapter 1.
25 See Rodrik (1995) for a detailed survey of the literature on the political economy of trade
policy. Also see Gawande & Krishna (2003) for a recent survey of the empirical literature in
trade policy.
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practice as the government would like to put a cap on the e¢ cient policy in order
to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis the lobbies. In this paper we extend
the analysis in Drazen & Limão (2004) to the choice between production subsidies
and tari¤s and to the context of the WTO accession.
The second related branch of the literature attempts to explain why a country
would want to join a multilateral organization such as the WTO. The existing
literature provides two main explanations. The rst explanation highlights the role
of the WTO as a way to overcome the terms-of-trade driven prisoners dilemma
faced by large countries (Bagwell & Staiger (1999), (2002)). Here we focus on the
case of a small open economy, which is unable to a¤ect its terms-of-trade.
The second set of explanations for why a country would wish to join the WTO
highlights the role of these trade agreements as a means to provide a credible
commitment mechanism against higher protection. For example, it is argued that
small countries may want to join the multilateral agreement in order to avoid the
dynamic inconsistency problem in the presence of income redistribution concerns
(Staiger & Tabellini (1987)). On the other hand, Maggi & Rodríguez-Clare (1998)
argue that in the presence of inter-sectoral mobility of capital and lobbying à la
Grossman & Helpman (1994), the government might prefer to join the agreement
if the long-run costs due to ine¢ cient resource allocation more than outweigh the
short-run gains to the government from lobbying.
Again, we see that these arguments typically focus on tari¤s, while ruling
out other instruments by assumption.26 However, if we want to know the e¤ect
of the WTO accession on protection, looking at tari¤s is not su¢ cient because,
as shown in Chapter 1, there are no common terms and conditions guiding the
accession process that relate to tari¤s. In fact, Article XII of the WTO that deals
26 One exception to this is the paper by Staiger & Tabellini (1987), which deals with both pro-
duction subsidies and tari¤s. However, in their model the government joins the trade agreement
as a commitment to provide lower tari¤s.
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with accession "...gives no guidance on the terms to be agreed, which are left to
negotiations between the WTO Members and the Applicant...." (WTO (2005)).27
Furthermore, the tari¤ commitments made by the acceding country at the time
of accession usually concern bound rates of tari¤s the ceiling rates above which
the tari¤s can not increase which can be very di¤erent from the applied tari¤
rates, especially for small developing countries.28
Thus, commitments made on tari¤s are lax and open to negotiations. Subsi-
dies, on the other hand, are guided by a strict set of WTO rules, the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), which are binding to all members
at the time of accession. As explained in detail in Chapter 1, the SCM agree-
ment disciplines both the use of subsidies and the available retaliatory actions
against subsidization by its members. The agreement prohibits the use of certain
subsidies, while other subsidies are actionable i.e., other member countries can
take retaliatory actions (by imposing a countervailing duty (CVD) against the
subsidized imports or by appealing to the dispute settlement body of the WTO)
against the subsidizing member.29 Since tari¤s and subsidies are obvious substi-
tutes, WTO accession provides a natural experiment for testing the e¤ect of these
rules on the choice of redistribution policies.
In this chapter we use these facts to extend the model in Drazen & Limão (2004)
to the case of WTO accession and the choice between production subsidies and
tari¤s. In particular, we show that a self-interested government could gain from
being part of the agreement, as that may help increase its utility by improving its
bargaining position vis-à-vis the domestic lobbies. We derive algebraic conditions
27 For a detailed outline of the WTO accession process see WTO (2005) and Lanoszka (2001).
28 For instance, according to the tari¤ levels negotiated since the Uruguay round, the average
bound rate in 2005 for Costa Rica was 44.6%, whereas the average applied tari¤ rate in1998
was only 6.4%. Similarly, the average bound rate in 2000 for Turkey was 42.6%, but the applied
tari¤ rate in 1996 was only 7.5%. (WTO (2001)).
29 For more details on the SCM measures see Legal texts - Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf
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under which the government gains through this channel and then illustrate, using
a numerical example, a situation under which these conditions would hold.
In order to highlight our channel we abstract from any other motives for the
existence of tari¤s and subsidies and focus only on their role as a tool used by the
government to redistribute income towards special interest groups. In terms of the
choice of redistribution policy, the model predicts that, when both subsidies and
tari¤s are available, the government will use only subsidies before accession to the
WTO. However, once the country joins the WTO, both tari¤s and subsidies will
be used for products that face a positive probability of retaliation if the country
engages in subsidization. This result implies that with accession we should see
an increase in tari¤s imposed on products that face a threat of retaliation if
subsidized.
The rst part of the result, that only subsidies will be used before acces-
sion to the WTO, is in line with a vast literature on instrument targeting. It
is widely known that a welfare maximizing government would use subsidies for
redistribution purposes when both subsidies and tari¤s are present, as subsidies
distort only production, whereas tari¤s distort both production and consumption
(Bhagwati & Ramaswami (1963)). Similarly, Dixit, Grossman & Helpman (1997)
show that, when faced with a choice between available instruments, even a self-
interested government would like to choose the more e¢ cient instrument.
In this chapter we abstract from other motives for the existence of tari¤s, how-
ever, in reality there exist several other reasons why tari¤s might be used even
prior to accession. For example, in the case of a large country, tari¤s might be used
to improve its terms-of-trade against the trade partners (see Johnson (1954)). Ev-
idence that countries use their market power in setting trade policies was recently
provided by Broda, Limão & Weinstein (2006). Similarly, tari¤s might also be
used as a way to generate revenue if other means of generating revenue are costly
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(Aizenman (1987), Corden (1974)). In the appendix we show that our main re-
sults remain qualitatively unchanged if we allow for collection costs for raising
revenues to nance production subsidies.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the un-
derlying theoretical model and presents our theoretical results.30 After presenting
the underlying structure of the model and describing the stages of the game, Sec-
tion 2.2 is divided in to three subsections: Subsection 2.2.1 discusses the choice
of policies once the regime has been chosen, Subsection 2.2.2 explores the ques-
tion of whether to become a member of the WTO and nally Subsection 2.2.3
presents a numerical example. Section 2.3 summarizes the results in this chapter
and provides some directions for future research.
2.2 Theoretical Model
Let us assume an open economy populated with consumers with homogenous pref-
erences. Assume that the preferences are given by the following utility function,




where x0 is the numeraire good and ui(xi) is an increasing and concave function
representing the utility from consuming the good xi. The consumers maximize




ixi  Ei where, pdi is
the price paid by consumers and Ei is the total income consisting of wage income
and any rent earned from the ownership of specic factor i.31 We assume that
each individual provides one unit of labor and owns at most one specic factor.
Due to the additive separability in the utility function the demand for a good
30 All proofs are provided in the appendix.
31 Note that, as explained below, the price paid by the consumer pdi might di¤er from the
producer price psi due to tax/subsidy given by the government.
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xi depends on its own price pdi , and is given by di(p
d
i ) = (u
0
i(xi))
 1; and the demand






i ). Hence, the indirect utility function
and consumer surplus will be given by,














We assume that the production of the numeraire good requires only labor and
is given by x0 = L0. Assuming that the labor supply is not binding xes the
wage rate, which we normalize to unity. Production of the non-numeraire good
xi requires both labor and an industry specic factor i, and takes place through
a constant returns to scale technology. Given that the wage rate is xed at unity,
the returns to the owners of specic factor i will depend only on the domestic
producer price of that good. Hence, the quasi-rent earned by the specic factors
in industry i is given by i(psi ), where p
s
i is the producer price. The Hotellings





We assume that at any given time there are an exogenously given set of sectors
in which the owners of specic factors have overcome their free rider problem and
are organized in to lobbies. These lobbies interact with the government in order
to determine the total level of a transfer that can take the form of a production
subsidy or tari¤ (to be determined endogenously). Furthermore, following the
existing literature, we assume that tari¤ revenue (or the net revenue generated to
nance subsidies) is distributed back to the population in a lump-sum manner.
32 In what follows we will suppress the arguments of the these functions whenever it is clear
from the context.
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Thus the gross welfare of lobby i will be given by
Wi = li + i(p
s
i ) + iN [S(P ) +R(P )] (3)
where li is the total number of individuals that own factor i and so it represents
their total wage income. S(P ) is the consumer surplus, R(P ) = Net tari¤/tax rev-
enue and i = fraction of the populationN that own specic factor i. Without loss
of generality we can normalize the population to one. In order to bring out our re-
sult more clearly, we assume that ownership of the specic factors is concentrated,
i.e. only a negligible fraction of the population owns the specic factor ki (i  0).
Assuming concentrated ownership enables each lobby to interact with the govern-
ment separately (see Drazen & Limão (2004), Maggi & Rodríguez-Clare (1998)).
This may also be closer to the reality as we normally see lobbying primarily done
for policies in ones own sector. This assumption helps us simplify the model, as
we can assume away counter-lobbying by other organized interest groups.
We assume that lobby i provides contributions (Ci), in the form of lobby goods,
to the government in exchange for production subsidy and/or tari¤s. Thus the
net welfare of the lobby is
Vi = Wi   Ci (4)
Finally, the government maximizes its own utility which is a function of the lobby
goods, Ci, and the social welfare, W , dened as the sum of utilities of all indi-
viduals in the economy. Following Drazen & Limão (2004), we assume that the
objective function of the government can be written as








is the weight that the government puts on contributions relative to gen-
29
eral welfare.33 As a ! 1 the model reduces to one with a welfare maximizing
government. We assume that 	 is an increasing and concave function such that,
	0(C) > 0;	00(C) < 0.34 The idea is that the contributions from lobbies takes the
form of goods or services that the lobby could provide, such as keeping employ-
ment articially high (Shleifer & Vishny (1994)) or arranging a trip to the golf
course.35
The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst stage the government decides
whether to be a part of the WTO. In the second stage lobbies and the government
negotiate on the level of redistribution policies. We assume that the government
can use either production subsidies (ti) or tari¤s ( i) (or both) as instruments for
redistribution. Note that a positive t implies a subsidy. We also allow both ti and
 i to be negative, implying taxes and import subsidies.
We consider the case of a small open economy. Assuming small economy
implies that at any given point in time the world price for a product i, pwi , is
independent of the actions of the individuals in this economy. The governments
interventions will create a wedge between the world prices and the consumer and
the producer prices in the domestic economy. Specically, the domestic prices
would be given by, pdi = p
w




i +  i + ti where p
w
i = world price,
pdi = domestic consumer price and p
s
i = domestic producer price.
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Given our assumption of concentrated ownership which implies that each lobby
interacts separately with the government, and treats the prices in other sectors as
33 The objective function in their paper is written as G = aW +
P
	i(Ci): Here it is rewrit-
ten in this formulation to make some of the expressions below more explicit without changing
anything qualitatively.
34 We also assume lim
C >0
	0(C) =1 that ensures an interior solution as shown in the appendix.
35 While for simplicity we assume that contributions enter linearly in the lobbys objective
function, we can also have contributions entering as an increasing and convex cost in the lobbys
utlity function to reect more clearly the lobby goods and services interpretation without chang-
ing much of our result.
36 Here the world prices are xed, as we assume a small open economy with perfect competition
in the products markets. For a discussion of optimal levels of tari¤s and production subsidies
under monopolistic competition in the lobbying framework see Chandra (2006a).
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given, we can omit the subscript i from here on. Hence, without loss of generality,
we will concentrate on the case of interaction between the government and a single
lobby.
2.2.1 Stage Two: Bargaining over Policy Levels
In the second stage, once the regime has been chosen, i.e. once the country has
decided whether to be a part of the agreement, the Nash bargaining between the
lobby and the government determines the equilibrium level of tari¤s, production
subsidies and the amount of lobby goods paid by the lobby in return for these
policies. Hence, the equilibrium levels of C; t and  will be given by:
Max
C;t;
F = (G  g0)(V   v0)(1 ) s:t: G  g0; V  v0 (6)
where g0 and v0 are the respective disagreement points and  is the bargaining
power of the government with respect to a given lobby. Since in the absence of any
lobby goods, the utility function of the government reduces to that of a benevolent
social planner, we know that in this case there will be free trade in equilibrium
and no subsidies. Hence, at the bargaining equilibrium, the levels of policies and
the lobby goods will be such as to yield at least as high a utility level for both
players as the disagreement utility given by the free trade levels.37
Before joining the agreement Let us rst look at the benchmark case where
the country has decided not to join the WTO (and hence, decided not to be a
part of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties). In this case the
country is free to choose its policies without any threat of retaliation from the
other members.38 Hence, the equilibrium level of contributions and policies will
37 Note that the disagreement level of utility is at the level of free trade in the sector in
question however, other sectors might still be protected.
38 The absence of retaliation is due to the small country assumption, which implies that this
countrys policies will not have an e¤ect on the rest of the world. If we extend the model to the
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be given by solving the Nash bargaining problem in equation (6), where the utility
functions of the government and the lobby are given by:
G = G(C; t; ) = 1 + (t; ) +   [d ()  0(t; )]  t0(t; ) + S() + 1
a
	(C)
V = V (C; t; ) = l + (t; )  C (7)
where we write the expressions directly as functions of the underlying choice vari-
ables. Note that (t; ) is the rent to the specic factors such that 0 > 0; 00 > 0
(by Hotellings lemma). Even though tari¤s and subsidies a¤ect prots in the
same way (by increasing the producer price), we can see that, unlike tari¤s, subsi-
dies do not a¤ect the consumer surplus, S(), since they a¤ect only the producer
price, while leaving the consumer price unchanged. This is because we assume a
small open economy, and hence, the consumers can buy the good from abroad.
In the above equation, equation (7),  (d ()  0(t; )) is the total tari¤ rev-
enue collected for any given level of tari¤ and subsidies, whereas  t0(t; ) is the
revenue needed to nance the subsidy. For notational clarity, henceforth we will
omit the arguments of these functions. We will also assume linear supply and
demand functions, even though our main results are valid as long as the demand
and supply curves are not too convex or too concave.
The rst order conditions for the problem in equation (6) can be simplied to







(V   v0)  (1  ) (G  g0) = 0 (8)






(0) = 0 (9)






(0) = 0 (10)
large country case then we would have to model the possibility of retaliation even if the country
was not a WTO member.
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Equations (9) and (10) give the contract curves in C   t and C    space respec-











Similarly rewriting (10) gives us










these two equations give the set of Pareto e¢ cient combinations of the levels of
contributions, tari¤s and subsidies which are candidates for equilibrium. Equation
(8) picks out the exact point on this contract-surface that will be chosen for
any given distribution of bargaining power between lobbies and the government.
















is the slope of the Pareto frontier at the
equilibrium point (when governments utility G is on the vertical axis and the
lobbys utility V is on the horizontal axis).39
In Figure 2.1a we show the indi¤erence curves for the government and the
lobby in the C   t space and the corresponding contract curve for any given level
of tari¤s  . We put the lobby goods C on the vertical axis and the subsidies t
on the horizontal axis. The indi¤erence curves for the government are upward
sloping with its utility increasing in the north-west direction; as it will need more
lobby goods from the lobby in exchange for higher subsidies to remain on the
39 See for example, Osborne & Rubinstein (1990).
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same indi¤erence curve. The concavity in C also implies that the governments
indi¤erence curves are convex. Similarly, lobbys indi¤erence curves are upward
sloping with its utility increasing in the South-East direction. The tangency points
of the two indi¤erence curves trace out the contract-curve.40
Substituting (9) in (10) implies that d0 = 0 which is only possible if  = 0:
This gives us the well known targeting result that, when the government has access
to two or more instruments of income redistribution, it will use the one which is
least distortionary. Here, while production subsidy generates only production
distortion, an equivalent tari¤ distorts both production and consumption. Hence,
in the absence of any constraints on the level of subsidies, only subsidies would be
chosen. Plugging  = 0 in to the above expressions also gives us the equilibrium
values of subsidies and contributions.
















where a ~ denote ad valorem rates and "s is the elasticity of supply.
Thus, consistent with earlier literature, when both subsidies and tari¤s are
present, the level of tari¤s is zero, whereas subsidies are chosen to fulll any
redistributive role. Note that, here we have only assumed redistributive roles for
tari¤s. The tari¤s might be positive even in the presence of subsidies if the country
is large, or if raising revenue to nance subsidies is costly. In the appendix we
show that allowing for this last channel does not change our main result.
We can also see that for the welfare maximizing government (i.e. a!1) the
40 We can also show that as long as the demand and supply curves are not too concave or too
convex the contract curve in the C   t space will be downward sloping.
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optimal subsidy is also zero. The optimal subsidy decreases with a, the weight
on welfare and "s, the elasticity of supply. That the level of subsidy will vary
inversely with the elasticity of supply reects the Ramsey concerns. Finally, the
level of redistribution policy also depends on the level of C and hence on the
bargaining power of the government vis-à-vis the lobbies. This is in contrast to
the results in Grossman & Helpman (1994), where tari¤s are independent of the
level of C (because of their assumption of quasi-linearity in C for both the lobby
and the government).
After joining the agreement If the country decides to join the WTO, it au-
tomatically becomes a party to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties. As mentioned earlier, this agreement prohibits the use of export sub-
sidies, however it allows member countries to use domestic subsidies subject to
the qualication that if these subsidies are found to cause injury to, or adversely
a¤ect the interests of other member countries (in the subsidizing country itself, in
the home market of the country that is hurt by subsidization or in a third mar-
ket), they can take appropriate retaliatory actions. Furthermore, as explained in
Chapter 1, other member countries can either retaliate unilaterally by imposing a
countervailing duty on the imports of the subsidized product from the o¤ending
country or take the subsidizing country to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of
the WTO. Thus, even though the export subsidies are prohibited, the WTO rules
impose a threat of retaliation against production subsidies given to both import
competing as well as the exporting sectors.41
Note, however, that the agreement does not say anything about a countrys
use of tari¤s as long as it does not exceed the binding limit that the country
agreed to at the time of accession. This ceiling level of tari¤s is called the bound
41 We account for the di¤erent costs of retaliation to sectors with a higher share of exports
explicitly in the empirical part in Chapter 3.
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tari¤. According to the WTO rules, the country is free to set tari¤s at any level
(applied tari¤) as long as it is below the bound tari¤. Since for most developing
countries there is a big di¤erence between the bound and the applied tari¤, we
will assume that this binding limit is not reached and, hence, the country is free
to use tari¤s even after accession.42
An alternative is to recognize that the level at which the tari¤s are bound
is negotiable at the time of accession and hence is subject to pressure from the
domestic lobbies, whereas the subsidy rules are nonnegotiable and become binding
on the date of accession. Thus, the governments ability to commit in the case of
subsidies is higher than in the case of tari¤s.
The SCM agreement allows countries to use certain kinds of subsidies, however
these are actionable i.e. other members can retaliate if these subsidies hurt their
interests. This implies that while not all subsidies are automatically retaliated
against, countermeasures are allowed in principle. Hence, in this model we assume
that joining the agreement implies that, when a country subsidizes its production,
other member countries can retaliate with some probability  2 [0; 1], with the
probability of retaliation varying across industries.
Furthermore, we assume that the lobby has to incur an extra cost R(t) when-
ever it gets a subsidy, which is then retaliated against.43 The SCM agreement
provides two separate channels of retaliation and hence at least two separate ways
in which R(t) could arise. On the one hand the SCM agreement allows the other
member countries to le a case against the subsidizing member (on behalf of its
domestic industry) to its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) if these subsidies hurt
their interests. Upon receipt of the allegations the DSB forms a panel to establish
the merit of the case, and if the defendant is found guilty, it is asked to remove the
42 We will use the applied tari¤ for our empirical tests in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
43 Here we treat the cost of retaliation as an additive cost for simplicity without highlighting
the exact source of the costs which would depend on the nature of retaliation. For a model
where the cost of retaliation arises endogenously see Chandra (2006b).
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subsidy itself or for removal of its adverse e¤ects (for example, by taxing the in-
dustry at an equivalent rate). The cost to the lobby of the subsidy being removed
is obviously signicant. Additionally, the resource costs associated with the legal
and administrative fees to participate in the DSB procedures can in itself be quite
substantial.44
On the other hand, according to the SCM agreement other members can re-
taliate against subsidies by imposing a countervailing duty on the imports of
subsidized product. There is a direct cost associated with the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties on the producers of these goods. Since we have assumed the
country to be small, the world price facing the producers remains xed. This
implies that the e¤ective price for the producers for each unit of subsidized good
sold abroad increases by the amount of the subsidy, psi = p
w
i + t. If the trade
partner imposes a countervailing duty on the subsidized products, the e¤ective
price to the producers decreases by the amount of the subsidy. If the CVD duty is
equal to the amount of the subsidy, as provided by the WTO rules, the producers
returns to the same situation as she was before the lobbying process, however, at a
lower level of welfare due to the costs incurred during lobbying.45 The uncertainty
associated with the outcome of the CVD or the DSB case can also impose a cost
for producers in the a¤ected sector.
In our model we assume that the retaliation only a¤ects the lobbys utility, for
simplicity. However, as we point out below, our results remain unchanged if we
allow the retaliation to a¤ect the governments welfare as well. The results will
44 Note that the legal and administrative cost could also arise in the alternative form of
retaliation involving the imposition of the CVD duty by the trading partners. Several papers
that study the use of anti-dumping duty (a duty with similar administrative procedures as CVD)
note that these costs can be quite signicant (see for example Finger & Fung (1993)).
45 An alternative strategy for the domestic producers to avoid paying the CVD duty is to shift
the exports to another country. However, it is not feasible to shift exports to another country in
the short run due to the xed costs involved. Moreover if all trade partners impose the CVD,
the domestic producers will get a lower export price, to the extent that they sell part of the
output abroad and that the CVD duty is not prohibitive.
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also remain unchanged if we assume retaliation to only a¤ect the governments
utility while leaving the lobbys utility una¤ected. We provide the corresponding
results for the latter case in the appendix. There are at least two channels through
which the retaliation lowers the governments utility. One is through a decrease
in the aggregate welfare. For example, an equivalent CVD imposed on a small
country brings the equilibrium back to the one before the subsidy. However,
the net e¤ect is a transfer of revenue from the subsidizing government to the
importing country. This loss in welfare could be even higher if raising revenue to
nance subsidies is costly. A second source of loss in utility for the government
could arise due to the stigma of not fullling its international obligations (see
Kovenock & Thursby (1992)).46
One nal question remains: if the subsidizing country is small, as assumed in
our model, why would other countries retaliate.47 In the case of a small country,
which faces a xed world price, all the benets of subsidies goes to the producers
of the good in the subsidizing country, with the equilibrium remaining unchanged
elsewhere. Hence, the trading partners do not have an incentive to retaliate. One
explanation for why the retaliation still exists in such a case is that the other coun-
tries are trying to enforce the WTO rules in order to deter future violations and/or
to discourage "socially wasteful" subsidy practices.48 For example, Sykes (2005)
notes "...Outside of the strategic trade area, the only plausible defense of counter-
vailing duties is the suggestion that they enhance global welfare by discouraging
wasteful subsidy practices..." (page 24).49
One explanation for why countries might chose to retaliate against subsidies
46 See Bown (2004) for an empirical study of whether the variables associated with interna-
tional stigma or the economic costs are more important for ensuring compliance with DSB.
47 In the case of large countries, the gains in terms-of-trade due to retaliation might outweigh
the loss due to forgone cheap subsidized products at foreign countrys expense.
48 See Sykes (2005)
49 Also see Jackson (1997). For a disucussion of countervailing duties and its impacts see
Sykes (1989).
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by imposing a CVD, even though the CVD might be harmful for the country
imposing the duty (at least in the short-run), is that the resulting gains from the
enforcement of subsidy rules could be jointly optimal for all countries. That the
deterrence of subsidies is one of the objectives behind retaliation against subsidies
can also be seen from the fact the focus of theWTO discipline on subsidies is on the
amount given, not on the extent to which the subsidy harms trading partners (see
Hoekman & Kostecki (1995)). The same argument might explain why members
would retaliate against a small subsidizing member, even though those subsidies
do not pose an explicit threat to the country imposing the duty. In fact, in the
real world we see that a lot of the countervailing duties are directed towards small
economies. Hence, here we abstract from this question and take the possibility of
retaliation from the trading partners as given.
Assuming that there might be retaliation against subsidies, the lobbys net
utility can be expressed as:
V (C; t;  ;) = L+ (t; )  C   R(t) (12)
where R0(t) > 0; R00(t) > 0 for t > 0 i.e., these retaliation costs are increasing
and convex in the level of subsidy.50 We also assume that (t)   R(t) > 0 i.e.,
these costs are not too high, so there exist positive gross prots in equilibrium.
Furthermore, we assume 0(t) R0(t) > 0 (subject to a boundary condition) i.e.,
the marginal prot from an extra dollar of subsidy is positive so that there are
gains from lobbying for subsidy.
Figure 2.1b shows the indi¤erence curves for the lobby and the government in
C   t space similar to those in Figure 2.1a. The threat of retaliation causes the
lobbys indi¤erence curves to become atter to the horizontal axis. This implies
50 We also assume R(t) = 0 for t  0 to reect the fact there would not be any retaliation
against production taxes. Finally, assuming R0(0) = 0 ensures an interior solution.
39
that due to the threat of retaliation, subsidies are now less valuable to the lobby
than before accession. In other words, for a given level of contribution, it would
require a higher level of subsidy for the lobby to achieve the same utility as before.
We can also see that the maximum utility available to the government now (G0m),
is lower than it was before the retaliation (Gm). The same is true for the lobby.
Hence, the threat of retaliation reduces the total surplus to be bargained over.
Nash bargaining between the government and the lobby, after the country joins
the WTO, takes a form similar to equation (6) with the only di¤erence that the
utility function of the lobby is now given by (12).51 The new equilibrium policies































where, ~ and ~t are ad valorem tari¤ and subsidy rates; "d; "s; "m are total demand,
supply and import demand elasticities and z is the inverse import penetration
dened as z = d
m
(inverse of the share of imports in the total demand).
Comparing equations (13) with those in (11) we see that, while the equilib-
rium tari¤ was zero when the country was not a party to the agreement, once the
country becomes a party to the SCM agreement, the equilibrium tari¤ is positive
whenever there exists a positive probability of retaliation ( > 0). Stated di¤er-
51 Note that here we are assuming that the costs of retaliation does not enter governments
objective function directly. Including these does not change the main qualitative results. The
reason is straightforward, when we include the costs of retaliation in the governments objective
function, it works to reinforce the loss due to retaliation. More specically, retaliation costs
make the lobbys indi¤erence curves atter in C   t space (with C on vertical axis - see g 1b).
If we include these costs in the governments objective function as well, it makes its indi¤erence
curves steeper reinforcing the results that the contract curve in C t space shifts to the left. Also
note that the formulation here might also be closer to the reality in that the retaliation directly
hurts the producer interests against which the retaliation is aimed rather than the government.
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ently, there will be an increase in tari¤s when the country is faced with a positive
probability of retaliation if subsidy is provided.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Impact of retaliation against subsidies on tari¤s: As the coun-
try joins the WTO (and hence the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures), there will be an increase in its tari¤s for those sectors where the prob-
ability of retaliation against subsidies is strictly positive compared to the case of
no retaliation.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the equilibrium conditions derived
earlier.
Intuitively, when the country is not a part of the WTO, it is not under the
purview of the SCM agreement, hence, it is relatively free to use its subsidy
policies. Given the fact that subsidies create less distortion in the economy than
tari¤s, tari¤s will not be used. However, post-accession there are strictly positive
costs to using subsidies for products that face a threat of retaliation. Hence, for
these products tari¤s would also be used. Thus, for products that face a threat
of retaliation we expect tari¤s to increase with accession. It is this prediction of
the model that we test in the empirical part of the dissertation.
Note that, while there is an increase in tari¤s as a redistribution tool when
the threat of retaliation increases from zero to a strictly positive level, once the
country is faced with a positive probability of retaliation, a marginal increase
in the threat has an ambiguous e¤ect on tari¤s. This is because while there is a
direct positive e¤ect of retaliation on tari¤s, there is also an indirect e¤ect through
equilibrium contributions. In the appendix, we provide su¢ cient conditions that
ensure that the tari¤s increase with the probability of retaliation. We can show
that if lobby goods fall following an increase in , that is a su¢ cient condition
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for an increase in tari¤s. While puzzling at rst, the intuition behind this result
is straightforward. As lobby goods fall, given the concavity of 	, the marginal
utility of an extra dollar worth of lobby goods to the government is higher, thus the
government would like to provide more protection. However, due to an increase in
the threat of retaliation, it is more costly to give the protection through subsidies,
hence the government uses tari¤s instead.
2.2.2 Choice of Regime
Once the country joins the WTO it faces a positive probability of retaliation if
subsidies are used. Thus the question is, can the government be better o¤ by
joining such an agreement? If the answer is yes, then we have found a motive for
the government to sign such an agreement.
Here we identify a new channel through which accession to the WTO serves
to increase governments utility. Specically, we show that the government would
like to be a part of the agreement as that improves its bargaining position vis-à-vis
the domestic lobbies. Thus, even though, with retaliation the total surplus from
the bargaining is lower, the government can benet as it gets a higher share of
the surplus.
In order to show this mechanism, we rewrite the maximized Nash product
for the generalized Nash bargaining problem between the government and the






(G) = V is the equation for the Pareto frontier (Muthoo (1999)).52
In the rst stage, the government wants to choose between the two alterna-
52 In the following we will suppress the arguments for notational clarity. Also a subscript
denotes partial derivative.
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tives: whether to join the agreement or not. The condition that helps us to
determine which of the two regimes it prefers makes use of the derivative of the
maximized value of L in equation (14) under each of these situations when  ! 0.
Before providing the condition we explain the underlying idea with the help of
the following gure.
In Figure 2.2 we plot the governments utility as a function of its bargain-
ing power  before and after the agreement. Since the disagreement utilities are
the utilities under zero tari¤s, zero subsidies and zero contributions, these utili-
ties remain unchanged regardless of whether the country becomes a party to the
agreement. Thus the government has no incentive to join the agreement if it has
zero bargaining power ( = 0). Because, regardless of its decision about accession,
it will receive its reservation utility, which has the same value in both cases.
On the other hand, as illustrated in Figure 2.1b, the maximum level of utility
attainable by the government (or the lobby) after joining the agreement is lower
than the maximum it could attain before joining i.e. Gmaxj>0 < Gmaxj=0 (sim-
ilarly, V maxj>0 < V maxj=0). That is because, post-accession, there is a positive
probability of retaliation, if subsidies are used ( > 0), which reduces the total
available surplus. Hence, when the government has full bargaining power ( = 1),
such that it receives the maximum surplus available, it would choose not to be a
part of the agreement as doing so decreases its utility.
Thus, whenever government has zero or full bargaining power, it has no incen-
tive to join the agreement. Since the government is always worse o¤ by joining
the WTO if it has full bargaining power, a su¢ cient condition for the government











In the appendix we show that using the maximized Nash product given in equation


















We call this the "Bargaining position improvement condition due to the WTO
subsidy commitment". The expression on the left hand side of equation (16) is
the ratio of the slope of the Pareto frontier for the lobby and the government
before and after the country has joined the WTO, for the case where the threat of
retaliation is positive, i.e. where the subsidy rules provide a commitment mecha-
nism to the government. This ratio captures the improvement in the bargaining
position of the government. The right hand side of equation (16), on the other
hand, reects the loss in the lobbys surplus due to the threat of retaliation under
the WTO SCM agreement. When, the government has zero bargaining power i.e.
 ! 0, the lobby gets the entire surplus from bargaining; hence, it represents the
aggregate loss in surplus which is no longer available for bargaining.
Thus, this gives us our next proposition,
Proposition 2 Governments optimal accession decision: A self-interested gov-
ernment will gain from the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties and
hence would want to be a member of the WTO if:
 the "bargaining position improvement condition due to the WTO subsidy
commitment" is met.
and only if:
 Both agents have some bargaining power and the utility is non transferable.
Proof. See appendix
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The rst part of the proposition states that, the government wants to be a













due to improvement in bargaining
position. The agreement involves being faced with a positive probability of retal-
iation when subsidies are used. That makes production subsidies costlier for the
lobby and, hence, leads to an improvement in the terms of trade in favor of the
government. However, as the retaliation by other countries also means a decrease
in the potential surplus that can accrue to the government from its relationship
with the lobby, the gain from an improved bargaining position should be su¢ -
ciently big to compensate the government for the loss due to reduction in the
size of the surplus. Below we show that this condition holds under reasonable
parameters.
This expression is similar to the proposition 3 in Drazen & Limão (2004),
where they nd that the government with a small bargaining power would nd it
optimal to forego the more e¢ cient instrument (lump-sum transfers) and instead
uses a relatively less e¢ cient instrument (production subsidy) for redistribution
as it improves its bargaining position vis-à-vis the lobbies. However, there are two
important di¤erences: (a) the choice of instruments is di¤erent in the two cases,
and (b) more importantly, they are interested in the binary choice between the
instruments whereas here both the instruments are available but the regime (the
threat of retaliation) is di¤erent.
The second part of the above proposition states the necessary conditions under
which a rational government is willing to join the WTO. One of the necessary con-
ditions is that the value of the governments bargaining power be strictly positive
and strictly smaller than one. We have seen earlier how both the extreme cases
(i.e. a bargaining power of zero or one) imply that the government does not have
an incentive to join.
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However, allowing only for intermediate values of bargaining power is not
enough. We must also have contributions entering non-linearly in the govern-
ments objective function. The reason is that in order to get any improvement in
the bargaining position, it must be the case that the slope of the Pareto frontier
becomes steeper due to the threat of retaliation for a given level of governments
utility. However, assuming quasi-linearity in contributions implies that the slope
of the Pareto frontier is constant, so the e¤ect of the improvement in bargaining
position is ruled out by construction. Intuitively, assuming that contributions en-
ter linearly in both the lobby and the governments objective function implies that
the contributions can be used to transfer utility. Under this scenario, trade poli-
cies are designed to maximize the surplus, while the respective bargaining powers
only determine how the surplus will be divided. Thus, any reduction in surplus
in the presence of transferable utility makes both parties worse o¤. Hence, we see
that both intermediate bargaining power and non-transferable utility are crucial
for the results derived in this chapter.
2.2.3 Simulations
Note that, while the above "bargaining position improvement condition due to the
WTO subsidy commitment" says that the government would gain from joining the
WTO, whether this condition will be satised will depend on the underlying func-
tional forms assumed. In order to verify that these conditions for improvement in
the bargaining position are plausible, we conduct the following simulation exer-
cise. We assume that the contribution function that enters the governments utility
function is given by, 	(C) = Cn where n 2 (0; 1). The production function is as-
sumed to be a standard Cobb-Douglas function, y = Ak1 l and the consumers
utility from consuming good x is assumed to be quadratic, u(x) = 10x   b
2
x2.
Finally, we assume that in the event of a retaliation ( > 0), when the country is
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a part of the agreement, the cost of being retaliated against is given by R(t) = Bt
where  > 1. These functional forms are consistent with earlier assumptions made
in this chapter.
We derive the equilibrium level of tari¤s and subsidies for both when the coun-










against di¤erent values of n, the degree of concavity of contributions





at the optimum level of tari¤s and subsidies before the country joins





when  > 0.
According to the simulation results, the condition in equation (15) is more
likely to be satised for low values of n, i.e. when the governments utility function
is more concave. Hence, the government with a more concave utility function is
more likely to gain from improved bargaining position due to joining the WTO.
Figure 2.3b shows that this conclusion is robust to other parameter values.
The equilibrium values of tari¤s and subsidies from the simulation exercise are
reported in Table 2.1. The simulations conrm the result derived in section 2.2.1
of the chapter that when the threat of retaliation () is zero, only subsidies will be
used in equilibrium. However, both tari¤s and subsidies will be used if the threat
of retaliation is positive. Note that, we see zero tari¤s prior to accession because
we abstracted from other motives for the existence of tari¤s. In the appendix
we show that the tari¤s will be positive even in the absence of retaliation if it is
costly to raise revenues to nance subsidies. In the appendix we provide a similar
numerical example in the presence of collection costs. Those simulation results
conrm that tari¤s will be positive even in the absence of retaliation.
According to the results in Table 2.1 both before and after accession the degree
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of protection takes a U-shape, i.e. the protection levels rst decrease and then
increase as the degree of concavity of contributions in the governments objective
function increases. Finally, we see that for the parameter values used in the
simulations, the total level of protection (tari¤s+subsidies) is higher when the
country is not a member of the WTO, than when it becomes a member, for all
values of n. It suggests that since the total protection is lower, the general welfare
is also higher under the WTO regime.
Another interesting question is to see what happens to the equilibrium levels
of tari¤s and subsidies as the threat of retaliation goes up i.e. a comparative-
static exercise. As we saw earlier in Section (2.2.1), we cant answer this question
unambiguously unless we assume explicit function forms.53 The results for this
comparative-static exercise is reported in Table 2.2. We can see that for the
functional forms (and the parameters) assumed here the tari¤s unambiguously
increase with , while the subsidies decline, as  goes from zero to one. Since the
sectors di¤er in the threat of retaliation against subsidies, the change in tari¤s
due to  will also be di¤erent across sectors. We will explore this di¤erence in the
threat of retaliation across sectors more in the empirical sections. Interestingly,
the total protection also goes down as the threat of retaliation increases. In the
appendix we show that these results are robust to inclusion of collection costs.
2.3 Conclusion
A leading explanation in the literature on the political economy of trade policy is
that tari¤s are primarily used for redistributing income towards special interest
groups. This literature typically assumes that tari¤s are the only instrument avail-
able to the government. In reality, however, a variety of instruments are available
to the government for redistribution purposes, with tari¤s and production subsi-
53 In the appendix we provide su¢ cient conditions for tari¤s to go up following an increase in
retaliation.
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dies being the two most important ones. In this chapter we show how the WTO
accession process and the associated rules a¤ect the choice and level of tari¤s and
production subsidies used in the acceding country.
We also identify a source of gain to the government from joining the WTO
previously unexplored in the literature. We argue that joining the WTO can be
a rational decision by a self-interested government that wants to increase its own
welfare. In particular, we believe that the current structure of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing duties can act as a credible device that helps the
government improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis the lobbies.54 Moreover, we
show that this source of gain can never arise if utility is assumed to be transferable
or if one party has complete bargaining power, two assumptions that are commonly
made in the literature. An interesting insight of the model is that, contrary to
common belief, the gains to the government from entering the WTO is not because
it allows them to lower tari¤s but because it allows them to reduce subsidies even
if in the process they actually increase some tari¤s.
While this, to the best of our knowledge, is the rst theoretical model that
explores the question of how WTO accession and its associated rules might a¤ect
the choice between tari¤s and production subsidies, a lot of work remains to be
done. For simplicity, the current model focuses on the case of a small country.
This assumption helped us focus on the policies in the acceding country, while
treating the rest of the world as exogenous. However, it would be interesting
to extend the model to the case of large countries. Such an extension could be
important for understanding how the terms-of-trade motive and the commitment
54 This, of course, is not the only explanation for why countries join the WTO as we note
in the text. In fact, one source of gain to the acceding member that is usually pointed out, is
that arising from the improved market access. However, as most countries already receive MFN
treatment from their trade partners even without being a member of the WTO, this particular
gain is probably not sizeable. Note that there might still be some gains due to the removal
of uncertainty related to securing MFN status. Whether this benet is signicant enough to
warrant WTO accession is a question for future research.
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motive analyzed here interact to a¤ect a countrys incentive to join the WTO.
Another important extension would be to move away from the perfectly com-
petitive market structure assumed in this chapter and to examine whether the
results could be generalized to alternative settings. In particular, it is important
to understand the optimum level of tari¤s and subsidies under alternative market
structures such as monopolistic competition, which is able to explain the exis-
tence of widespread intra-industry trade, and oligopoly, as they are in the center
of many existing subsidy debates e.g. Boeing vs. Airbus. It is also interesting
to study how the WTO subsidy rules and the associated threats of retaliation
against subsidies a¤ect the levels of tari¤s and subsidies in these settings, a task
that I have recently undertaken.
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CHAPTER 3
3 Evidence using Chinas Accession to theWTO
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide empirical evidence in support of one of the main pre-
dictions of the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Ac-
cording to the model, accession to the WTO will lead to an increase in a countrys
tari¤s for products that face a positive probability of retaliation when subsidized,
as some of the subsidies will be substituted by tari¤s. We test this prediction of
our model using the case of Chinas accession to the WTO in December 2001.
This is an important prediction as it highlights a direct, yet unexplored, channel
through which WTO rules a¤ect the policies in the acceding country. In doing so,
this chapter also contributes to a small but growing empirical literature on the
impact of the GATT/WTO membership on member countries.
While, in recent years, several papers have tried to measure the impact of
GATT/WTO accession, the results have been mixed. In one of the most impor-
tant contributions to this literature, Rose (2004a) nds that there is a negligible
impact of the GATT/WTO membership on a countrys trade volume or a coun-
trys trade policy (Rose (2004b)). Since then, several papers have tried to explore
this seemingly puzzling result. Subramanian & Wei (forthcoming), for example,
point out that, while a signicant impact of the GATT/WTO membership does
not seem to exist for developing countries, the membership has increased trade
for the industrial countries. Similarly, Tomz, Goldstein & Rivers (forthcoming)
argue that, once we also take into account the countries that had the same rights
and obligations as members, even though they were not members of the GATT
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formally, membership seems to have increased the volume of international trade.55
While these papers have tried to explore the impact of WTO membership on
a countrys volume of trade, the question of whether WTO membership a¤ects
the acceding countrys trade policy is still relatively unexplored. By providing
evidence in support of our main hypothesis, we also ll this gap in the literature.
In particular, in this chapter we provide robust evidence that accession to the
WTO and the associated threat of retaliation against subsidies had an impact on
the level of its tari¤s as China joined the WTO.
However, quantifying the inherent substitution across instruments is an impor-
tant exercise in its own right. By shedding light on the mechanisms underlying the
switch across instruments, we hope to understand the channel through which the
choice of instruments is made in the rst place. In fact, Drazen & Limão (2006)
point out that it is important to understand the mechanism behind why and how
the choice of one instrument out of several is made as "...Models that fail to ex-
plain why apparently more e¢ cient polices are not used are incomplete and likely
to generate incorrect predictions..." (page1).
Even in the narrow connes of the trade policy, it is important to understand
the link between production subsidies and tari¤s as they are among the most
widely used instruments of trade policy. However, despite there being several
important theoretical papers discussing the optimal levels of production subsidies
and tari¤s, especially in the strategic literature, there are relatively few empirical
studies that focus on this issue. In one of the few empirical papers along these lines,
Mitra, Thomakos & Ulubasoglu (2004) study the determinants of tari¤s (protec-
tion) and production subsidies (promotion) using Turkish industry-level data and
nd that the mix of protection versus promotion is inversely related to the ratio
of their respective dead weigh losses. Ederington & Minier (2006), on the other
55 For other recent papers along these lines see Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) and Liu (2006).
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hand, look at the aggregate cross-country data to explore the determinants of the
choice of tari¤s over subsidies.
Given the well-known e¢ ciency of subsidies over tari¤s, the WTO rules that
discourage subsidies are quite puzzling. In fact, Bagwell & Staiger (2004) write,
"...when viewed in the light shed by the existing theoretical literature on domes-
tic subsidies in trading economies,...attempts to discipline the use of production
subsidies appear misguided, if they simply redirect government interventions to-
ward the use of second-best instruments of intervention such as tari¤s..." (page
1). The 2006 WTO World Trade Report recognizes the importance of the issue
but says "...The extent to which stronger subsidy rules have inhibited commit-
ments to reduce tari¤s is obviously an empirical matter in respect of which we
have no evidence..." (page 196). Our theoretical model in Chapter 2 provides an
explanation for this puzzle as it argues that the WTO subsidy rules serve as a
commitment mechanism that improves the governments welfare. In this chapter
we provide empirical evidence that shows that the WTO subsidy rules and the
associated channel we highlight can have a strong e¤ect on tari¤s.
An important task, in order to carry out this test, is to identify a proxy for the
"threat of retaliation". According to the WTO rules, existing members can retal-
iate against another member countrys use of subsidies either by imposing a CVD
on the imports of the subsidized product or by going to the Dispute Settlement
Body of the WTO. However, in reality CVD duties are much more frequently
used means to retaliate as compared to the DSB, hence we will focus on the coun-
tervailing duties.56 In explaining the role of CVDs and the WTO subsidy rules,
Hoekman & Kostecki (1995) note that given weak substantive discipline on sub-
56 Since CVD duties are targeted at subsidized exports, these will be e¤ective as a retaliation
tool only if China exports in that sector. However, this is not a constraint for us, as there is a
lot of bilateral trade even at the HS six digit level. According to our sample, out of a total of
4776 products that China traded with the world during 1999 there were only about 132 products
where China engaged in one way trade i.e. it only imported or exported.
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sidies in the GATT (and now in the WTO), the threat of imposing countervailing
duties can be thought of as the primary disciplining device.57
Looking at the countervailing duty actions taken in the WTO, we see that
some products and industries have been targeted much more frequently than oth-
ers. Furthermore, the existing empirical evidence suggests that variables such as
political economic strengths of the industry are very important in determining
whether it will be successful in getting a countervailing duty imposed on its coun-
terparts in the subsidizing country. Since these political economy factors are rela-
tively persistent, past retaliations can help in predicting future actions. Hence, we
use past countervailing duties imposed by Chinas major trade-partners (against
members other than China) to derive a proxy for the "threat of retaliation" faced
by China when it entered the WTO.
We construct a product level dataset on Countervailing Duties imposed by
Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US four of the heaviest users of countervail-
ing duty measures and also major trade partners of China between 1995-2001 by
using their WTO notications and o¢ cial government publications. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical study to use six-digit product level
countervailing duty data for a broad set of countries. We use the underlying vari-
ation in the way countervailing duties are targeted across di¤erent industries to
derive a proxy for the threat of retaliation faced by Chinese industries at the time
of the countrys accession to the WTO. Thus, this chapter also contributes to the
relatively scant, though growing, empirical literature on the impact of retaliation
by a trading partner on a countrys trade policy.58
57 While subsidies can also be challenged through the WTO Dispute Settlement System, the
instances of disputes invoking the SCM are considerably fewer than those invoking the GATT
(Bown (2002), Leitner & Lester (2006)).
58 See Feinberg & Reynolds (2006), Blonigen & Bown (2003) and Prusa & Skeath (2005).
Note however that both Blonigen & Bown (2003) and Prusa & Skeath (2005) look for retalia-
tion at the country level. While Feinberg & Reynolds (2006) looks at the individual HS section
level retaliation, that is still very broad compared to our product or industry specications. Also
note that all these papers deal with anti-dumping duties, whereas here we use CVD duties.
54
We nd that there was a relative increase in Chinese tari¤s in sectors where
there was a higher threat of getting hit by countervailing duties when China joined
the WTO. According to our most conservative estimates, there was a relative
increase of at least 0.5 percentage points (or about 9%) in ad valorem tari¤ rates,
for products that faced a positive probability of retaliation, compared to those that
did not. In further support of the model, we show that the impact of the threat of
retaliation was higher in sectors with higher exports precisely the sectors in which
the cost due to retaliation would also be high.59 We perform numerous sensitivity
and robustness checks and nd our results to be robust across specications.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines our em-
pirical strategy and describes the rationale for adopting this strategy. Section 3.3
gives a description of the data. Section 3.4 presents the main empirical results of
the chapter and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Accession to the WTO implies that the country faces a probability of being re-
taliated by other members if it engages in subsidization. Our theoretical model
predicts that joining the SCM agreement, which implies a positive probability
of retaliation when subsidies are used, would lead to an increase in tari¤s as an
instrument for redistribution. In what follows we test this prediction of the model
using a disaggregated product level data on applied tari¤s for the case of Chinas
accession to the WTO in December, 2001.
Before moving any further with the empirical exercise, we must note an im-
portant qualication of our empirical strategy. It is important to note that a test
of this prediction is not a direct test of the model for two reasons: a) A structural
59 In our case the relevant threat of countervailing duty is the threat of CVD being imposed by
Chinas trade partners on imports of subsidized Chinese products. Hence, for any given level of
CVD duty, the losses to Chinese producers will be higher the higher its exports of that product.
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test of the model would require data on lobby contributions linked to the policies
in question or require us to make some explicit assumptions about the parameters
of the model. In the absence of these one can only attempt to perform a reduced
form estimation. b) The hypothesis that there will be an increase in tari¤ when
faced with a positive threat of retaliation in a related instrument is not a unique
prediction of this model.
However, having said that, even though we may obtain a similar prediction
about tari¤s going up if we add subsidies and the threat of retaliation to some
of the existing models trying to explain gains from accession to WTO, adding
subsidies as another redistribution device to those models reduces the strength
of their main results. For example, according to Maggi & Rodríguez-Clare (1998)
the reason a small country joins the multilateral agreement is because it leaves the
government better o¤ in the long run by avoiding capital misallocation towards
the protected sector. Once we add subsidies to their model and allow the tari¤s
to rise following accession, these long-term gains are no longer as large, hence
weakening the main force behind their result. Furthermore, while this hypothesis
looks obvious in hindsight, this is the rst study to examine and attempt to
quantify this result despite widely acknowledged substitutability between tari¤s
and subsidies.
As noted in Chapter 2, countries generally negotiate on the bound tari¤s at
the time of accession and not the applied rate. Since the bound rates are the
ceiling rates above which the tari¤s cant increase, we use the applied rates in
our empirical section which are generally much lower, and hence exible, which is
consistent with the assumptions of our model. For example, Ecuador bound most
of its tari¤s at the rate of 30 percent lower when it joined the WTO in January
1996, whereas the average applied tari¤s were at a much lower level at about 17
percent ad valorem (USTR (1997)). However after accession Ecuador increased
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its tari¤s across the board, "something that was possible in view of the binding
overhang of its WTO tari¤ commitments" (Evenett & Primo Braga (2005)).
Thus we can focus on the applied tari¤ rates for our empirical analysis. How-
ever, the average applied tari¤s also usually go down with accession due, for ex-
ample, to unilateral liberalization e¤orts by the country.60 For example, Ecuador
had undertaken unilateral liberalization since 1990. Similarly, China was also un-
dergoing a unilateral liberalization during this period so its applied tari¤s were
decreasing even before the accession. Thus, instead of focusing on the strict ver-
sion of the prediction, that tari¤s will increase with accession in sectors that face a
higher threat of retaliation when subsidized, we look at relative increase in tari¤.
3.2.1 Countervailing Duties and Existing Evidence
In order to motivate our strategy of looking at the past retaliation to get a proxy
for the threat of retaliation, it is instructive to look at the CVD duties used in the
WTO by the members, and some of the existing empirical literature in the area,
before moving on to discuss our methodology.
Table 3.1 provides a sectoral breakdown of the CVD duties imposed during
1995-2004 as reported in WTO statistics on subsidies and countervailing mea-
sures.61 The WTO reports these data based on the semi-annual notications of
the members. In this table each countervailing duty order in a sector against a
given country is counted once though every order may contain several products.
As we can see from the pattern of countervailing duties, some industries are much
more likely to be targeted by CVDs than others. For example the Steel industry
(HS section XV) alone accounts for almost 40% of the total new CVD measures
60 Note, that there are actually many products (43) in our sample where the tari¤ rates went
up following accession and it remained same for about 625 products. As shown in the next
chapter, Chapter 4, for Taiwan the number of products for which tari¤s increased following
accession is even higher (about 400 products).
61 Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm
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between 1995-2004 (source- SCM gateway, WTO). On the other hand, there are
some industries widely known to be the recipient of subsidies, like Paper and Pulp
(HS section X) or Footwear and Umbrellas (HS section XII), which did not have
a single new measure imposed during this period. The simple correlation between
the CVDmeasures imposed by the US and the EU, two major users of CVD duties
is very high (0.66). Classifying countries into groups of developed and develop-
ing countries, we again nd that the correlation between the two groups across
sectors that had a CVD imposed is 0.68, indicating that similar set of industries
have been targeted by the CVD by di¤erent countries.
Thus, we use the information contained in the past countervailing duties by
major trade partners to predict the probability that a countervailing duty would
be imposed if subsidy were to be given.62 Industries which have been frequent
targets of the CVD are expected to have a higher probability of being retaliated
against.63 Hence, for those industries where the probability of a countervailing
duty being imposed is higher, we would expect the protection in the acceding
country to switch towards using less e¢ cient means - such as tari¤s.
One of the most important anecdotal evidence in support of our strategy relates
to the paper and pulp industry. As mentioned earlier, there has not been a
single incidence of positive countervailing duties in this industry between 1995-
2004. Thus, according to our hypothesis we should see subsidies being used in
this industry in China, as our strategy predicts low probability of getting hit
62 Past CVD duties give a picture about the probability of CVD being imposed not only
because it gives an idea about the political strength of the industry in the partner country, but
also because a number of studies have shown, a) the trend of industries ling for relief in the
same products where the duty was imposed earlier and b) the higher probability of nding a
positive outcome if a duty had been in place in past. For example, Blonigen (2006) suggests
that the past experience in ling for AD petitions helps the rms to lower the cost of petitions
as well as a¤ects the likelihood of successful outcomes.
63 That some industries are targeted more frequently than others, has also been noted else-
where. For example, Chu & Prusa (2004) note that, while most of the three-digit (ISIC) Chinese
manufacturing industries have been targeted by anti-dumping duty, four sectors - Chemical,
Machinary & Equipment, Textile and Basic Metals - account for 80 percent of all cases.
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by a countervailing duty based on past CVD activities. According to a recent
report prepared by American Forest & Paper Association (June 2004) and draft
statement of US-China Joint Commission on Trade Working Group on Structural
Issues (May 04), this indeed seems to have taken place in China. The report
mentions, as one of its key ndings, plans by the central government to provide
subsidies to this industry through a number of nancial and tax incentives.64
Note that, this may also just reect the fact that all countries are subsidizing
this sector and so if one uses a CVD against another it will also face CVDs on
its own exports. This again is consistent with our approach that not all sectors
that use subsidies would automatically face a retaliation. Hence, there exists a
di¤erential probability of retaliation for di¤erent products even if they all use
subsidies; which is what we exploit in the empirical strategy.
Finally, in order to be able to provide a suitable proxy for retaliation we
need to understand what elicits retaliation against subsidies. Hence, we look at
the existing literature that looks at the determinants of CVD from the point
of view of the country imposing the duty. Most of the existing empirical stud-
ies in this area either focus exclusively on Anti-dumping duties (AD) or lump
both AD and CVD duties together. This is not surprising, since the administra-
tive procedure for imposition of AD and CVD are similar. Two papers that fo-
cus exclusively on CVD are Marvel & Ray (1995) and Baldwin & Steagall (1994).
Marvel & Ray (1995) focus on the determinants of countervailing duties in the
US from 1980-1993, and observe that the "same protectionist forces" that lead to
anti-dumping duty also give rise to the countervailing duties. On the other hand,
Baldwin & Steagall (1994) show that besides the economic variables indicating
64 (Source-https://www.bipac.net/afpa/pdf/China_Key_Findings6-3-04.pdf,
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/us-china-jcctwg/comments/afpa-jcctwg-cmt.pdf
Note that, recently after a long gap of not applying a countervailing duty against a non market
economy, the rst countervailing duty initiated by the commerce department is on imports from
paper industry of China.
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injury to the domestic industry a number of other factors are also responsible for
a positive CVD outcome (imposition of duty). Though, they note that economic
variables are more important in the CVD cases as compared to the AD cases.
There are a number of other papers that pool both AD and CVD duties
together and conclude that political economy variables are important determinants
of these types of protection. Some of the pioneering papers in this literature are
Finger, Hall & Nelson (1982) and Hansen (1990). Along similar lines, in one of
the recent studies using US ITC decisions on antidumping and countervailing
duties, Hansen & Prusa (1997) nd both economic and political variables to be
important.65
Thus, whether a CVD will be imposed depends on factors such as political
economy variables of the country that is hurt by subsidization. Since, these factors
are likely to be exogenous to the political economic factors of the country whose
subsidy decisions we want to study, we can use the CVD measures imposed by its
major trading partners (against other countries) to get the expected probability of
getting hit by CVD in an industry if the acceding country engages in subsidization.
3.2.2 Empirical methodology
Baseline Model The reduced form equation for tari¤ rates in China can be
written as
 jt = j + t +  Pr(Retaliation)jt + Yjt + jt (17)
where j are a set of product specic factors. t are the time dummies and Yjt is
a vector of other variables leading to the imposition of tari¤s. Pr(Retaliation) is
zero for all products before the country signs the agreement. However, once the
country becomes a part of the WTO there is a positive probability of retaliation if
65 While most of these studies relate to the US there have been some studies related to EU
and Australia with similar conclusions.
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the country engages in subsidization. Furthermore, this probability of retaliation
might di¤er across industries depending on the product and the political economic
characteristics of the trading partners. We proxy Chinas perceived threat of
retaliation were it to use subsidies, by the countervailing duties imposed by these
four countries on other WTO members between 1995 to 2001 (inception of WTO
and Chinas accession). More specically, we assume the expected probability of
retaliation for any product j to be given by
Pr(Retaliation)jt = (at + cCV Dj) WTOt (18)
where WTOt is an indicator that takes the value one when the country is a
member of the WTO (and hence the SCM agreement), and is zero otherwise.
Similarly, CV Dj is an indicator that takes the value one if at least one of the
above four trading partners of China had imposed a countervailing duty against
another WTO member for that product during 1995-2001. A priori, we expect
that c > 0.
Thus, if we take the time di¤erence of (17), taking a period before and after
accession we can write it as,
 j = + cCV Dj + Zj + "j (19)
where  = (t   t 1) + at and Zj = Yj is a vector of other variables which
a¤ect changes in tari¤ rates. This transformation into the di¤erence form has the
advantage that all unobserved time-invariant product-specic e¤ects are being
controlled for in the regression.
According to our main hypothesis, when there is a higher probability of being
hit by a CVD the government will give protection through tari¤s. Thus, there will
be a relative increase in tari¤s in sectors that face a higher threat of retaliation,
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ceteris paribus. Thus we expect the coe¢ cient (c) to be positive. Note that we
are taking change in tari¤s i.e.  = tari¤ after accession-before accession, thus
a positive coe¢ cient on CV Dj indicates a relative increase in tari¤s.
Interaction Model While the earlier model gives us the average e¤ect of
the probability of getting hit by a countervailing duty on the change in tari¤,
in order to see whether this is indeed due to retaliation one needs to go further.
More specically, as suggested by the theory, the threat of retaliation will only
be important if the cost due to retaliation is also high. If the cost imposed by
retaliation is negligible, the threat will not have any e¤ect in the way a country
chooses its policies. As CVD duties mentioned here are the duties that would
be imposed by Chinas trade partners on the Chinese exports of the subsidized
product, the cost of retaliation for China will be higher in a sector where it has
higher exports. Thus we expect the threat of retaliation to be more e¤ective when
Chinas exports in that sector are also high. In order to test this hypothesis we
write our second specication by modifying (19) as
 j = + cCV Dj + Expj + cCV Dj  Expj + Zj + "j (20)
where Expj indicates Chinas exports of product j (as a measure of cost of re-
taliation) and CV Dj  Expj is the interaction between the threat and the cost
of retaliation. Here the coe¢ cient of interest is  which we expect to be posi-
tive. A positive  would mean that the e¤ect of retaliation on relative increase in
tari¤s is higher when exports are also high. Furthermore, we should also expect
( + Expj) (the marginal e¤ect of threat of retaliation) to be positive.
The coe¢ cient on exports,  (our proxy for cost of retaliation), is also interest-
ing in its own right. The coe¢ cient  measures the average e¤ect of an increase
in exports on the change in tari¤s when there is no threat of retaliation. We
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expect this coe¢ cient to be negative, i.e., sectors with higher exports will see a
relative decline in tari¤s. According to the literature there are at least two chan-
nels through which this e¤ect may work, a) when the export sector is large (has a
comparative advantage) it is less dependent on the protection in the home market
and b) other countries will be more successful in negotiating a decline in tari¤s
if there does not exist a powerful domestic import competing lobby demanding
protection.
Predicted ProbabilityModel The above two approaches give equal weights
to the products where the countervailing duty was imposed by only one country as
compared to that when it was imposed by all countries. Thus, the above models
only give us the average e¤ect for those products which face a positive threat of
retaliation versus those which do not. Hence, as our third strategy we follow a
two step procedure. First we predict the probability of CVD in a given indus-
try i by using bilateral, out-of-sample data, and then use this in the regression
for change in tari¤s by plugging it as a regressor in (19) instead of the indicator
for CVD. These predicted probability would give us the measure of the Chinese
governments expectation of the threat of retaliation in any given industry at the
time of Chinas accession to the WTO.
In order to predict the probability that a CVD would be imposed if the gov-
ernment decides to use subsidies, we use panel information on past countervailing
duty actions by the four users of CVDs in our sample. While we use a number of
di¤erent specications, the basic equation to be estimated in the rst stage, using
stacked data for all four countries in our sample, can be written as
CV Djict = i +$c +$t + Wjict + jict (21)
where CV Djict is a binary variable that equals one if the country c had imposed a
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CVD duty against one or more of its trading partners for any product j of industry
i at a given time t, and is zero otherwise. We include industry dummies (two digit
Chinese industry codes), i, for industries that had a positive countervailing duty
imposed in at least one of the products in the given period. Thus, dummies for
only those industries that had previously been retaliated against were included in
the regression.66
An alternative way to interpret i is as ($i  Ii) where $i is the full set of
industry dummies and Ii is an indicator that indicates whether that industry
has been targeted by a CVD in the past. Thus we can treat industries with
zero observed CVD as the omitted category, and i can be interpreted as the
average probability of getting hit by a CVD relative to the industries which never
got retaliated against. Here $c and $t are the full set of country and time
dummies respectively. and Wjict refers to other possible determinants of CVD
duty. As shown in section (3.2.1), according to the existing empirical literature,
the main determinants of the imposition of CVD are either the industry-specic
political economy factors or country- and time-specic factors like real exchange
rates.67 The idea here is that once these other variables and time and country
specic factors are accounted for, the industry dummies i will capture the factors
specic to an industry that make it a more or less likely target of CVDs. Thus
the estimated coe¢ cient of industry dummies from the model gives the average
probability of imposition of CVD on a product belonging to that industry.
66 Otherwise it doesnt make sense for an industry to have a predicted probability of retaliation
based on past CVD if the observed instances of CVD are zero. Another reason why we want to
include only industry dummies with at least one CVD duty in the specication (but include all
observations) is to make the regression results between linear probability and logit estimations
comparable. Note that Logit and Probit can not estimate the group dummies if the outcome is
the same for all observations belonging to that group (see for example, Caudill (1987)).
67 Apart from studies mentioned earlier that suggested the political economy determinants
of AD and CVD duties, Mah (2003) has shown that the imposition of countervailing du-
ties in US is positively correlated with macroeconomic variables such as growth rates. Simi-
larly, Knetter & Prusa (2003) have shown positive relationship between antidumping lings and
macroeconomic variables like real GDP growth and real exchange rates.
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Since the dependent variable (CV Djict) is binary we use both the linear prob-
ability model and the logit specication to estimate the above equation. In the
next step we use these predicted industry coe¢ cients from the rst stage as the
probability of retaliation. Thus we estimate an equation similar to (20), except
that instead of the CV Dj indicator we use the predicted coe¢ cients from the rst
stage. Thus step 2 involves the following regression,
 ji = + c̂i + Expj + c̂i  Expj + Zj + "j (22)
where ̂i is the industry e¤ects measures in the rst stage. Note that, since the
probability of retaliation is based on an estimated regressor it will be measured
with error and so we have to take this in to account when interpreting our results.
In order to correct for this problem we use the method outlined in Gawande (1997)
and Gawande & Bandopadhyay (2000).68
3.3 Data
Since the four traditionally heavy users of countervailing duties Australia, Canada,
the EU69 and the US are also some of the main trading partners of China, we
use countervailing data from these countries to predict Chinas perceived threat
68 Gawande (1997) follows the methodology suggested by Fuller (1987) for correcting the error-
in-variables. The main idea is to treat the di¤erence in the variance of the estimated coe¢ cients
and the mean of the measurement error variance as an estimate of the true measurement error.
Thus, whenever the variance of the estimated coe¢ cient exactly equals this value it can be
treated as one measured without error and otherwise can be scaled up or down according to the
following formula,











where, ~i = corrected coe¢ cient for industry i, ̂i = estimated coe¢ cients from the rst stage,
̂ = mean of the estimated coe¢ cients, 2̂ = sample variance of the estimated coe¢ cients, ̂
2
ei
= estimated measurement error for a given coe¢ cient (variance of the estimated coe¢ cient for
industry i), and ̂2e = mean of the estimated measurement errors.
69 The EU is considered to be a single partner for our case comprising of the 15 countries
before its enlargement in 2004.
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from facing countervailing duties in a given industry at the time of its accession to
WTO. According to article 25.11 of SCM agreement of the WTO, each member
country is required to submit a semi-annual report to the committee on subsidies
and countervailing measures, notifying the countervailing actions (both measures
and initiations) taken during the period in question. While these reports are rela-
tively incomplete, it is the only source of information on countervailing duties for
all countries in a consistent way and is easily publicly accessible at one point.70
We take the countervailing duties in force information from the semi-annual
reports of these four countries for the period 1995-2001 (The period from the
date of establishment of WTO to the date of accession of China). Since, these
semi-annual reports only state the names (besides the date in force) of the cases
(broad category) and not the actual products involved, the information about
the products on which these countervailing duty were imposed was taken from
respective government publications for each of the four countries. For US, the
information regarding the products involved in a given case was taken from various
issues of the Federal Register. For the European Union, the relevant information
is regularly published as council regulations in the O¢ cial Journal. For Canada
the product codes involved were taken from the Canada Border Service Agencys
Dumping and Subsidy information section (for some cases the information came
from the Canada Gazette and the Canada International Trade Tribunal). Finally,
for Australia the corresponding product codes were taken from the Australian
Customs Services Dumping and Countervailing Duties status reports.
Since, the most disaggregated level at which the product codes are consistent
across countries is at the six digit level of Harmonized Schedule (HS6), we do our
analysis at this level. The data on bilateral imports for these four countries were
70 Note that most of the countries publish their countervailing duty (or trade remedy) in-
formation in their government publications. However, to be consistent across countries the
information in these WTO notications was taken as the starting point.
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taken from COMTRADE database at the HS6 digits from 1993-2003. Import
and export data for China are also from the same source. In addition the data
on tari¤s from 1996-2003 for China at the HS6 digits were taken from TRAINS
database.71
The data on the manufacturing industries in China was taken from various
issues of the China Statistical Yearbook (published annually by China Statistical
Bureau). The information on manufacturing industries is at the two digit level of
Chinese industrial classication (39 mining and manufacturing industries). This
industrial classication is based on the three-digit ISIC classication, though it is
sometimes more detailed than that (Source - United Nations Statistics Division).72
In order to get the concordance between HS6 digits and Chinese industrial codes,
the concordance table between six digit HS products and four digit ISIC industries
(about 80 manufacturing industries) fromWITS software (World Bank) was used.
Hence, the six digit trade and tari¤ data were concorded to the four digit ISIC
industries, which were then matched in to di¤erent Chinese industrial codes.
The average (applied) tari¤ levels in China for the years 2000 and 2003 for
Chinese two digit industries are given in Table 3.2.73 We can see that there is a
lot of variation in tari¤ structure both before and after accession to the WTO.
Some industries have very high tari¤s as compared to others. The fact that
these industries also happen to be industries where tari¤ rates are higher in other
countries around the world (e.g., Tobacco processing, Beverage manufacturing,
Textile and garment industries), suggests that similar kind of political economy
forces are at play in China.74 The third set of columns in that table refers to the
(absolute) change in tari¤s within this period.
71 Tari¤ information for 2002 for China was not available.
72 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/ctryreg/ctrydetail.asp?id=191,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/24/33982319.pdf)
73 These are simple unweighted averages.
74 Note that for tobacco industry the standard deviation for tari¤s in 2000 is zero i.e. all six
digit product categories belonging to this industry had the same high rate of tari¤.
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The average tari¤ rates in China have gone down with accession to WTO
(from 17% to 11% ad valorem rate). However, we can see that the changes in
tari¤ rates have not been uniform across industries, and range from reductions as
low as 1 percentage point to as high as 27 percentage points. In fact, while for
the paper industry the average tari¤ rates have fallen from 14.9% to about 7.4%
(a reduction of 49%), for chemical ber industry an industry with roughly equal
initial tari¤ rates the tari¤s have gone down from 14.9% to 9.1% (a reduction
of only 39%).
Note that, in light of our earlier observations, this is exactly what we expected
to nd. Paper industry, an industry with relatively few instances of countervailing
duties, will have a higher reduction in tari¤s than another industry like chemical
ber, where a number of countervailing duties have been imposed in past, as
subsidies can no longer be given to the chemical producers freely.75
3.4 Results
In this section we report the results of the three approaches to test our main
hypotheses described in the methodology section. The results are provided in
following sub-sections depending on the model being discussed.
3.4.1 Main Results
Baseline Model Our dependent variable is the change in applied tari¤s in
China, tari¤s in 2003-tari¤s in year 2000, which is regressed on the CVD indicator
and other controls.76 The most obvious covariate that one should control for is
the initial level of tari¤s, as the amount of the change in tari¤s is likely to depend
on the initial tari¤ level. However, it is not immediately clear what the sign of
75 Note, as mentioned earlier, the US paper and pulp association has alleged that China
engages in rampant subsidization.
76 In order to minimize any possible problems due to endogenity of regressors, we use the
controls from a year before the initial year in the dependent variable.
68
the coe¢ cient of initial tari¤s should be. On the one hand, because the outcome
of WTO negotiations generally takes the form of a given percentage reduction in
average tari¤ levels, we would expect the reduction in tari¤s to be higher for the
industries where the initial tari¤ rate is higher. This would also be true if we think
of accession to the WTO as a commitment device by the benevolent government,
and hence expect the tari¤ reductions to be larger where, pre-accession reform was
not possible due to some sociopolitical factors. On the other hand, if tari¤s were
a result of lobbying, a high initial tari¤ would indicate the political (bargaining)
power of that group and hence we would expect this group to be successful in
getting lower cuts.
Table 3.3 reports the regression results of the baseline model as given by (17).
The rst column reports the results when we regress the change in tari¤s on CVD
and the tari¤s in year 1999. We can see that not only is the coe¢ cient on CVD
positive and statistically signicant at one percent level, but it is economically
signicant as well. According to these estimates, there was a relative increase of
0.8 percentage points (or about 14%) in tari¤s for products where a CVD had
been imposed in the past. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient on initial tari¤ is negative
and signicant implying that products that had a high initial tari¤ were faced
with higher reductions as China joined the WTO.
Since tari¤s will not decrease any further if they were zero to begin with, the
next column reports the results of a regression where we add a dummy indicating
whether the product had positive tari¤s in 2000. The SCM agreement concerns
the industrial subsidies and the WTO subsidy rules for agricultural products are
slightly di¤erent. Therefore, the third column restricts the sample size to products
belonging to the mining and manufacturing industries. As we can see from the
table, the qualitative results remain unchanged, even though the value of the
coe¢ cient in the restricted sample is slightly lower.
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In the above regressions we included tari¤s in 1999, one year before the initial
year in the dependent variable, in order to minimize any bias arising from the
endogeneity of tari¤s. However, if the same political economy variables that give
rise to tari¤s in 1999 also a¤ect the change in tari¤s, omitting them would lead to
biased and inconsistent coe¢ cients. Hence, in column four we include additional
variables suggested by earlier literature that can explain the level of tari¤s. Note
that, while the coe¢ cient on CVD is now signicant only at 10 percent level of
signicance, the size of the coe¢ cients has increased compared to the case with
only initial tari¤ as control.77
Finally, in the last column of Table 3.3, we use an instrumental variables
approach to tackle the potentially endogeneity of tari¤s. We use, a) the average
of year 1999 applied tari¤s of four countries with similar levels of per capita income
as China Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa and b) the applied tari¤ of
Taiwan in the year 1999 as instruments for Chinas tari¤ in 1999. The idea is the
following: since before accession China is relatively free to choose its tari¤ level
(at least theoretically), it will set tari¤s according to its comparative advantage
and political economy factors. Hence, its tari¤ level and structure is likely to be
similar to countries with similar stages of development. At the same time, because
these countries are not big trade partners of China, they will not have a say in
the negotiated reduction in Chinese tari¤s, hence, the proposed instruments will
not be correlated with the dependent variable.78 Again, the results are similar to
the ones we got before.79
77 In this as well as all the following specications where industry level data is used as ex-
planatory variables the reported standard errors allow for clustering at the industry level.
78 Note that, Taiwan is one of the major trade partners of China. However, it was not
a member of the WTO during the period of analysis and hence did not participate in tari¤
negotiations with China. Dropping Taiwan and using only the average tari¤s for the other four
countries leaves the results unchanged.
79 Note that we are using applied tari¤ rates for these countries, and moreover an average over
them, thus there is even fewer chance that the instrument only reects a negotiated agreement
with other countries such as US. Furthermore, the simple correlation between chinese tari¤ and
any of the other developing countries included is only around (0.4-0.5), however the correlation
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Thus, according to the regressions reported in Table 3.3, there is an evidence
of a relative increase in tari¤s for products that faced a threat of retaliation. In
order to check that the results derived earlier are due to retaliation, and not to
some unobserved industry characteristics that happen to be correlated with the
CVD indicator, we conduct the following counterfactual exercise. If the results are
truly driven by the threat of retaliation, then retaliation should not have the same
e¤ect before China joined the WTO. In Table 3.4a we replicate the regressions
in Table 3.3, but instead of using time period 2000-2003 we use the period 1997-
2000, before China joinedWTO in 2001. Thus, in these regressions, the dependent
variable is the change in tari¤s between 1997 and 2000 and is regressed on similar
controls as in Table 3.3. As we can see from the results reported in Table 3.4a,
the coe¢ cient on CVD is no longer positive for any of the specications.80 In fact,
in almost all cases the coe¢ cient is negative and signicant, indicating a relative
decrease in tari¤s for these products. These results indicate that if indeed there
are some omitted characteristics that are correlated with the CVD variable, they
would lead to a downward bias in our earlier estimates.
Another concern with the evidence provided in Table 3.3 is that it could be
driven by sectoral shocks that a¤ected tari¤s for these products around the world,
and our proxy for retaliation is just picking up that e¤ect. In order to verify
that the e¤ect we identify is indeed a threat of retaliation related to accession, we
look at the tari¤ changes during the same period for the four developing countries
mentioned earlier  Brazil, Indonesia, India and South Africa. While applied
tari¤s in these countries also declined during this period on an average by about
2 percentage points, there exists a lot of variation. The biggest drop was for a
product in South Africa which saw a tari¤ decline of about 32 percentage points,
is 0.7 when we take the average over these countries hence indicating that the results are not
driven by any single one of these countries.
80 Note that for the IV specication in the case of counterfactual exercises the instruments
fail the overidentication test.
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whereas for a product in India the tari¤ went up by 60 percentage points during
the same period. A simple correlation between the change in tari¤s for these
countries and China does not show any relationship, with the correlation varying
between -0.07 for India to about 0.16 for Indonesia and South Africa. This is in
sharp contrast to a very high positive correlation observed earlier, between the
levels of applied tari¤s for 1999 among these countries and China (The correlation
varies between 0.46 for Brazil and for South Africa to about 0.59 for Indonesia;
the correlations increase to 0.66 if we take an average.)
In order to further support our claim we exploit the variation in average tari¤
changes for these countries between the period under consideration (2000-2003).
The results of this counterfactual exercise are reported in Table 3.4b. The rst
column reproduces the results from column 1 of Table 3.3 for comparison. In
column 2 of this table we include the average change in tari¤s for these four
developing countries as an additional control variable. We can see that, not only
the coe¢ cient on the threat of retaliation is still positive and signicant at 1%
level, the size of the coe¢ cient is also similar. As an alternative strategy, in
the third column we regress the average change in tari¤s for these countries by
using a similar specication our measure of threat of retaliation and the level
of tari¤s for these countries in 1999. As expected, the threat of retaliation is no
longer signicant. Thus, the evidence in Table 3.3 along with these counterfactual
exercises seem to make a strong case for the validity of our hypothesis.
Interaction Model In this model we test the alternative hypothesis where
we interact the threat of retaliation with the associated cost of retaliation. The
threat of retaliation by itself would be of little signicance if the stakes involved
were very small. The more China exports in any given sector, the higher the
costs of facing a countervailing duty, and hence, the more e¤ective the threat
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of retaliation. Note that using the post-accession level of exports could lead to
inconsistent estimates, since post-accession exports will be endogenous to the
changes in tari¤s if the goods are close substitutes. Hence, we use exports values
for year 1999 that are more likely to be exogenous to the changes in tari¤s.81
In Table 3.5 we present the results for the interaction model. In the rst
column we report the results where we use as proxy for the threat of retaliation
Chinas exports to the four trading partners enumerated before. The interaction
term is positive and signicant at the one percent level, indicating that the threat
of retaliation is more e¤ective when the associated costs are higher. This result
remains unchanged when we restrict the sample to the industrial sector, add other
political economy variables, use alternative measure of cost of retaliation (use
Chinas exports to the world), or use instrumental variable estimation. The results
for these specications are reported in columns 2-5 of Table 3.5. According to the
results in column 1, for products with average exports the impact of retaliation is
3% higher as compared to those with zero exports.82
Note also that the coe¢ cient on exports is negative and signicant in almost
all cases. Thus, for those industries that do not expect to be retaliated against,
higher exports are associated with a larger decline in tari¤s. Indeed, we would
expect industries where China is already exporting to need less protection. Even
if they do need protection, if these industries are less likely to be targeted by
CVD, then it is more e¢ cient to use subsidies instead of tari¤s, and hence we
81 Note that in our theoretical model we assume a small open economy that does not have
any market power. However, in reality even small countries might have some degree of market
power in the products they specialize in. This is certainly true for the case of China. To the
extent that a countrys market power in a given product/sector is reected in its volume of trade
of that product, we control for that market power by including exports in these regressions. As
noted earlier, we have also included the import volumes in some of our specications without
changing our results.
82 Note that COMTRADE only reports the data for which positive exports were recorded.
Hence, if we do not observe exports in our sample, it could mean either that the data is missing
or that there were no exports. In the results shown here we only look at the non-missing exports
as reported in our data source. However, the results remain unchanged if we make the other
extreme assumption and treat missing observations as cases of zero exports.
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would expect a negative sign for exports. In contrast, the e¤ect of exports is
lower for industries with a positive threat of retaliation. The evidence from the
regression reported in the rst column suggests that for products that do not face
any retaliation, a 1% increase in mean exports leads to 1.2% decrease in tari¤s.
However, for those products that face a retaliation against subsidy a 1 % those
products that face a retaliation against subsidy a 1 % increase in mean exports
will lead to a 3 % increase in tari¤s.
Table 3.6 reports the results from a counterfactual exercise using pre-accession
data, as earlier. These regressions use specications similar to those in Table
3.5, but use the 1997-2000 sample, from before Chinas accession. Again, if earlier
results were not due to accession, but rather, to some other omitted characteristics,
we should expect to see similar signs on the coe¢ cients. As we can see from the
results, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative and insignicant for all
the specications, which further supports the validity of our results.
Predicted Probability Model In our nal specication we exploit the
variation in the threat of retaliation across sectors. In the rst step we use pooled
cross-section data on countervailing duties imposed between 1995-2001 by the
four countries in the sample Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US to get
an estimate of the probability of retaliation as perceived by China at the time of
accession. In the second step we use the estimated probability of retaliation in
specications similar to the ones used in the interaction model.
The rst stage results are presented in Table 3.A1. We estimate the probability
of retaliation using both linear probability model and the logit model.83 The rst
three specications belong to the linear probability model, while the next three
use the logit model. In both specications, the rst regression includes only the
industry dummies as regressors, whereas the second specication also includes
83 These regressions report odds ratios in case of logit specications.
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country, as well as the time dummies. Finally, the third regression also includes
some other variables that might help explain the CVD the Herndahl share of
exporters, the number of exporters and the growth of imports in that product
category.84 We see that results are very similar across the two models. In fact,
the lowest correlation between the coe¢ cients from di¤erent specications is 0.94
between column (3) (full specication in the linear probability model), and the
odds ratios from column (5) (the regression with only industry, country and year
dummies in case of logit specication). In what follows, we use the coe¢ cients
from column (2) as a measure of the predicted probability of retaliation in an
industry in the second step.
In the second stage we reestimate the specication given by (20), but instead
of using the CVD indicator, we use the estimated coe¢ cients from the rst stage
(Pr(Retaliation)). The results are reported in Table 3.7. As these are estimated
regressors we should take this fact in to account. If the null hypothesis is that the
coe¢ cient on the estimated probability is zero, the standard t-statistics are valid
(see Wooldridge (2002)). Thus, the rst three columns in Table 3.7 report the
estimation results using the estimated proxy for retaliation but without making
any corrections. In all the specications we use coe¢ cients from the rst stage
regression that included all industry, country and year dummies. In line with our
earlier results, these regressions show that the coe¢ cients on the interaction term
are positive and signicant in all cases.
However, because we reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cient on esti-
mated probability of retaliation is zero, we need to take the measurement error
into account before we can make further inferences. Thus, in order to tackle the
problems that arise from the fact that we use estimated regressors, we use the
84 Besides these we also estimated specications that control for yearXcountry specic factors
to control for country specic shocks which did not necessarily coincide with a global shock.
The coe¢ cients on industry dummies again remain similar. Table A2 lists simple correlation
across the di¤erent specications.
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procedure outlined in Gawande (1997). The last three columns in Table 3.7 repli-
cate the rst three regressions but using the corrected coe¢ cients. We again see
that the coe¢ cient of interest, the interaction between the probability of retalia-
tion and the cost of retaliation, is positive and signicant across all specications.
Furthermore, the signs and signicance of other variables are also similar. Thus,
we can conclude that the threat of retaliation is more e¤ective when the cost of
retaliation is also high.
3.4.2 Robustness tests
In addition to the robustness tests discussed earlier, we conduct a number of
additional robustness tests to check the validity of our results. While one set of
robustness tests deal with the robustness of results to the selected sample, the
other set looks at whether the results are sensitive to the presence of outliers
in the data. Table 3.8 reports the results for some of these robustness exercises
for the rst specication in the interaction model.85 Columns (1) and (2) report
results where the sample is constrained to include only the manufacturing sector
or only those industries where at least one of the products had been a target of
the CVD in the past, respectively. Column (3) reports results for a regression
where, instead of using data from 1999, which is likely to be correlated with 2000,
we go further back and use the rst year in our sample (1996) for which the data
is available. We see that the results are not sensitive to any of these alternative
specications.
The next three specications try to rule out the possibility that our results
are driven by potential outliers in the data. The rst of these regressions uses
median regression, which is less sensitive to the presence of outliers. In the sec-
ond specication the observations which were detected as outliers using the Hadi
85 Other robustness results are available but not reported to conserve space.
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criterion were dropped. The nal specication uses an alternative technique to
minimize the sensitivity of results to outliers in the export data. According to this
strategy, we create dummies that categorize exports depending on whether they
take a value below, above or fall between the 33rd and the 66th percentile. If our
hypothesis is correct, we should expect the interaction terms on the highest cate-
gory dummy to be positive. According to the results in Table 3.8 the coe¢ cients
on the interaction terms for the hi dummy (exports higher than 66th percentile)
is positive and signicant. Hence, the earlier results are robust to the presence of
outliers.
3.5 Conclusion
The existing literature on the political economy of trade policy suggests that it
is mostly is used for redistribution purposes. This literature typically assumes
that tari¤s (trade taxes/subsidies) are the only instruments available to the gov-
ernment. In reality, however, a variety of other instruments are available to the
government, with tari¤s and production subsidy being the two most important
ones. In this chapter we show how the WTO accession process and the associ-
ated rules a¤ect the choice and level of redistributive policies used in the acceding
country.
We empirically test one of the important predictions of the theoretical model
that accession to the WTO will lead to an increase in tari¤s in sectors that face a
threat of retaliation in response to subsidization. We construct a unique product
level dataset on countervailing duties imposed by four major users of CVD and
use the underlying variation in the way countervailing duties are targeted across
di¤erent industries as a proxy for the threat of retaliation. In particular, we use
this variation to explain the di¤erences in changes in tari¤ rates across industries
as China joined the WTO. Consistent with our hypothesis, we show that indus-
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tries with higher probability of getting hit by countervailing duties experienced a
relative increase in tari¤s. Furthermore, the threat of retaliation seems to have
had the strongest e¤ect in industries where the costs of retaliation would also have
been high.
Apart from providing evidence in support for one of the main hypothesis of the
theoretical model that explains a puzzle regarding inconsistency of WTO subsidy
rules noted by many, this chapter is also the rst to show how the WTO rules
on subsidies can a¤ect the extent of tari¤ liberalization at the time of accession.
In this chapter we have tried to check the robustness of the result and provide
interesting counterfactual evidence to support the main result. However, whether
this result is generalizable, or specic to China, is an important question that one
must answer before any broad conclusions can be made. In order to answer this
question we look at the case of Taiwans accession to the WTO in January 2002
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
4 Empirical Evidence using Taiwans Accession
to the WTO
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide evidence in support of the main hypothesis of our
theoretical model using the case of Taiwans accession to the WTO in January
2002. One of the main goals of the chapter is to see whether the evidence in
Chapter 3 can be generalized to other countries. Recall that in Chapter 3 we
show that there was a relative increase in its tari¤s as China entered the WTO
for those products that faced a threat of retaliation against the use of subsidies
versus those that did not.
The case of Taiwan is interesting in its own right for a number of reasons.
First, Taiwan joined the WTO as its 144th member on 1 January 2002, and China
acceded on 11 December 2001, hence the timing of the events makes the two studies
natural cases to compare. Second, unlike China, which is the third largest player
in the world with a total share of around 7% of the world trade, Taiwan ranks
16th in terms of the total world merchandise trade.86 Given that our theoretical
model in Chapter 2 assumes a small economy, it is important to see whether we
get the same results in the case of Taiwan as the case of China. Third, Taiwan had
already undertaken signicant unilateral liberalization starting in 1980s, bringing
down its tari¤s to low levels. In fact, in the view of many observers, Taiwan had
already met the necessary requirements for accession to the WTO and was just
waiting for Chinas entry (Mastel (1999), Tsai (1996)).87
86 (Source: WTO Statistics Gateway available at http://stat.wto.org)
87 The Peoples Republic of China strongly insisted that Taiwan not be allowed to join the
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We nd strong evidence in support of our hypothesis. Our estimates also indi-
cate that the impact of threat of retaliation for Taiwan was similar in magnitude
(in terms of the percentage points increase) to that for China. However, given
the fact that Taiwan was already a highly liberalized economy as compared to
China even prior to its WTO accession, the similarity in numerical magnitude is
even more striking. In fact, according to our estimates, the threat of retaliation
against subsidies led to a 65% increase in relative tari¤s for products that faced
this threat as compared to those that did not, as Taiwan joined the WTO.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we provide some
background information on Taiwans trade policies and its accession to the WTO.
We describe the econometric strategy in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we discuss the
main results as well as the robustness of these results and nally we conclude in
Section 4.5.
4.2 Taiwans Trade Policies and WTO Accession
Taiwan applied for membership to the GATT on 1 January 1990 under the name of
"Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" also known
as "Chinese Taipei".88 The working party for its accession was established in
September 1992, and was later transformed into a WTO working party following
the establishment of World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995. The
working party met ten times before its nal meeting on 18 September 2001 when
it successfully completed 12 years of negotiations and agreed to forward Taiwans
terms of accession. Note that, only a day before, on 17 September 2001, the
working party for Chinas accession to the WTO had successfully completed its
WTO before its own accession. This view of letting China become a member before Taiwans
accession was also shared by many other existing WTO members.
88 Taiwan applied for the membership under GATT Article XXXIII and hence its status in
application was di¤erent from that of Hong Kong or Macau which acceded under Article XXVI
on the sponsorship of a contracting party.
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negotiations over Chinas terms of accession (source: www.wto.org).
This timing of almost simultaneous accessions is no coincidence, of course.
Even though Taiwan had successfully completed its negotiations with most mem-
bers by late 1999, the formal acceptance was postponed, since China insisted
that Taiwan should not be allowed to accede to the WTO before China did
(Anderson (1997), Hsieh (2005)). While formally many WTO members believed
that the two accession process should run their separate courses, there was a tacit
understanding to not allow Taiwan to join the WTO before China did, lest China
be o¤ended (Morrison (2003)). The exact timing of Taiwans accession, and hence
the date when the WTO rules became applicable, was made even more uncertain
by the fact that the timing of Chinas own accession was uncertain.89
As part of its accession to the WTO, Taiwan agreed to lower its tari¤s from
20% to 12.8% in agriculture and from 6% to 4.1% for industrial goods. According
to the WTO trade statistics database, in 2006 the average applied tari¤s on all
goods was 6.4% below the nal bound rate of 6.6%.90 The total value of Taiwans
merchandise exports was $198,169 million and its total merchandise imports were
up to $182, 708 million in 2005, making it 16th rank country in the world in
terms of both exports and imports. Taiwans biggest trade partners are China and
Japan, with China accounting for 21.6 % of Taiwans total merchandise exports
and 25.3% of its merchandise imports. The US and the EU are also two of the
89 Despite 12 long years of wait since it applied for membership, even as late as 1999, Chinas
entry to the WTO was still uncertain as it had not completed its negotiations with most of the
important members. While, US and China reached a record agreement after Chinese Premier Jhu
Rongjies visit to US in Apr 1999, the talks stalled again due to US bombing of Chinese embassy
in Belgrade. (China, Still Angry at U.S., Wont Resume WTO Talks, International Herald
Tribune June 30, 1999). The talks stumbled again in Oct 2000 over the issue of legal reforms
(Chinas Entry to WTO Unraveling, John Pomfret & Philip P. Pan, International Herald Tribune
October 11, 2000); and in January 2001 over farm subsidies (Discord Over Farm Subsidies Snarls
Entry : China Delayed at WTO. International Herald Tribune January 18, 2001).
It was not until June 2001 that its bilateral negotiations with EU were complete).
(http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/09/18/china.wto.timeline/
provides a concise timeline of Chinas accession history).
90 (Source: country prole, Chinese Taipei www.wto.org)
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important trade partners for Taiwan, with both of them together accounting for
26.7% of the exports and 21.2% of the total imports.
As an economy with heavy reliance and engagement in international trade, Tai-
wan was well on its way to liberalization even before its accession to the WTO.
Note that until 1980, Taiwan had actively pursued a policy of export promotion
and import substituting industrialization in key industries according to its indus-
trial plan. Even during 1979-1980 the average tari¤ rate in Taiwan was as high
as 40% along with very high non-tari¤ barriers. However, the resulting trade sur-
plus, and a potential for ination, led Taiwan to start liberalizing the economy
(Liu (2002)). Due to the liberalization episodes that followed the average tari¤s
had already decreased to below 10% by 1995.
According to Liu (2002), who looks at the determinants of the two phases of
trade liberalization in Taiwan (between 1986-92 and 1992-95), the former phase
was associated with unilateral reform, as opposed to the latter phase, when ex-
ternal interventions were more apparent. Hence, the structure of 1992 tari¤s is
more likely to reect domestic considerations, including the pattern of domestic
pressure groups. By contrast, the tari¤ cuts in the latter period were the result
of negotiations with the US and hence are likely to reect the industrial lobbying
interests in the US, at least to some extent. We take this fact into account in our
empirical section .
Table 4.1 reports the average applied tari¤ in Taiwan for years 2000 and 2003
and the change in tari¤s during this period at the level of 3 digit ISIC industries.
We can see that even before its formal accession, Taiwans tari¤s were much lower
than those in China. The average ad valorem tari¤ for year 2000 was 7.7 percent.
With its accession in January 2002, tari¤s declined further by about 1 percentage
point to approximately 6.7 percent.91 Despite its low tari¤ barriers, there was a
91 Note that, the average decline is slightly masked by the fact that for many products the
tari¤s did not decline (for example, those with zero initial tari¤); and in fact it went up for more
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huge variation in both the levels and the changes in tari¤s. Agriculture, Food
Manufacturing and Processing enjoyed high levels of protection, with Tobacco
Manufacturing being the most protected sectors both before and after accession.
In our estimations below we try to explain part of this variation in the change
in tari¤s associated with accession and to see how this variation depends on the
threat of retaliation against subsidies.
4.3 Econometric Strategy
In order to make the analysis as similar as possible to the one used in Chapter
3, we use identical econometric strategies in both cases. Hence, we employ a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodology across years and across products to identify
the impact of the threat of retaliation on the acceding countrys tari¤s.
Reproducing our nal econometric equation from Chapter 3, we estimate:92
 j = + cCV Dj + Zj + "j (24)
where  j =  jt   jt 1 is the change in tari¤s on product j between period t  1
(before accession) and the period t (after accession). Since Taiwan acceded to the
WTO in January 2002, we use the same time period (2000-2003) as in the case of
China, to measure the change in its tari¤s due to accession.93 Choosing such short
than 400 products in our sample.
92 The original reduced form equation for tari¤s is  jt = j + t +  Pr(Retaliation)jt +
Yjt + jt; where where j are a set of product specic factors and t are the time dummies.
The Pr(Retaliation) is zero for all products before the country signs the agreement. However,
once the country becomes part of the WTO there is a positive probability of retaliation if
the country engages in subsidization. We measure the Pr(Retaliation) by Pr(Retaliation)jt =
(at + cCV Dj) WTOt; where WTOt is an indicator that takes the value one when the country
is a member of the WTO (and hence the SCM agreement), and zero otherwise. We expect c  0.
Similarly, CV Dj is an indicator that takes the value one if at least one of the member trading
partners of had imposed a countervailing duty against another WTO member for that product
during 1995-2001. Plugging this measure of Pr(Retaliation) in the reduced form tari¤ equation
and taking a time di¤erence we get equation (24).
93 Since most of Taiwans bilateral negotiations for its accession to the WTO had been com-
pleted by 1999, an alternative is to use the tari¤ change between 1999-2003 as our dependent
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span of time helps us minimize the possible impact of any other events during the
period under investigation.
Our main coe¢ cient of interest is that on the proxy for the threat of retaliation,
which in our case is the CVD indicator, which takes on a value of one for those
products that had su¤ered a retaliation in the WTO before Taiwan became a
member. In addition to this indicator we also include the level of pre-accession
tari¤s from a year before Taiwan became a WTO member to capture the political
economy considerations and other reasons determining the level of tari¤s.
Since we have the same time period of analysis, the perceived threat of retalia-
tion against subsidies by the two countries (China and Taiwan) would also be the
same.94 Hence, as in the case of China, we use the countervailing duties (CVDs)
imposed by Australia, Canada, the EU and the US on any other member of the
WTO between 1995 - 2001 to measure the threat of retaliation as perceived by
Taiwan. We expect the coe¢ cient  to be positive if our hypothesis is correct. As
in the case of China we carry out our analysis at the six digit level of HS codes, the
most disaggregated level at which the product nomenclature is the same across
countries.
4.4 Results
In this section we present our empirical results. The rest of the section is struc-
tured as follows. We rst provide our baseline results followed by two counter-
factual exercises to conrm the validity of our results. We then look at only a
subset of the data where the tari¤s went up (or did not decline), because, strictly
speaking, our model suggests that the tari¤s will go up following accession. We
variable. Our results remain unchanged if we use this period instead.
94 Since the two countries share the same information set about the existing use of coun-
tervailing duties, they are likely to have identical structure of perceived threat of retaliation,
except for a country-specic e¤ect which gets subsumed in the constant term when we estimate
in di¤erences.
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conclude this section by conrming the robustness of our results to alternative
specications and sample selections.
4.4.1 Baseline Results and Counterfactual Exercises
Our baseline results are provided in Table 4.2. The rst column of Table 4.2
replicates a result from Chapter 3 for the case of Taiwan. In this case we use
the Taiwans tari¤ levels in the year 1999 as a measure of the pre-accession level
of tari¤s. The coe¢ cient on CVD indicates that there was a relative increase of
0.9 percentage points in tari¤s imposed by Taiwan for those products that had
su¤ered a retaliation against subsidy through imposition of a CVD in the past.
This estimate is roughly the same as the 0.82 percentage points that we obtained
for China. Note, however, that Taiwan was already a relatively open country as
compared to China and once we take into account the total average liberalization
in Taiwan during this period, the evidence is even more striking. According to
these estimates the relative increase in tari¤s for products that faced a threat of
retaliation was approximately 63%.
In the rst column we used Taiwans tari¤s for the year 1999, a year be-
fore the rst year used in constructing the dependent variable, as a measure of
pre-accession tari¤s. However, as noted in Section (4.2), Taiwan had already
completed its negotiations by 1999. Hence these tari¤s might already reect con-
cessions granted by Taiwan, so we must consider going back to avoid endogeneity.
According to Liu (2002), the rst phase of liberalization in Taiwan (1986-92) was
largely free of external interventions and reected the domestic industrial policies
and strengths of the domestic pressure groups. Hence, we use the Tari¤ in 1992
as the pre-accession level of tari¤s in all subsequent regressions, unless otherwise
noted. The results reported in column 2 of Table 4.2 indicate that both the eco-
nomic magnitude as well as the statistical signicance of our coe¢ cient of interest
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have increased, with the threat of retaliation leading to a relative increase in tari¤s
of 1.1 percentage points.
In the third column of this table we add a dummy that takes the value one
for those products that had positive tari¤s in year 2000, and zero otherwise. Note
that if the tari¤s were already zero they would not be lowered any further. In
our data there are about 600 products that already had zero applied tari¤s in
2000. Since these products may share a common unobserved product specic
characteristic we need to control for them (Limão (2006)). We see that including
this dummy does not change any of our results.
In all the above regressions not only does the coe¢ cient of interest suggest
that our hypothesis is true, the coe¢ cient on our measure of pre-accession tari¤ is
also negative and signicant. This result is similar to the one we obtained in case
of China and suggests that the tari¤s decreased faster for those products where
the initial tari¤ rate was high.
These regressions did not include any explanatory variables other than the
CVD and the pre-accession tari¤s, however, our results may be biased if there
are some omitted characteristics that inuence the change in tari¤s. Since these
omitted characteristics are generally industry specic, such as the ones reecting
political economy strength, and are likely to remain unchanged over such a short
span of time, in column 4 we include industry dummies (classied as 3 digit
ISIC rev. 2 Industries). While including these xed e¤ects slightly decreases the
magnitude and the level of signicance of our coe¢ cient of interest, the qualitative
results remain unchanged.
Finally, if the omitted variables mentioned earlier are correlated with the level
of pre-accession tari¤, that would lead to inconsistent estimates. Hence, we adopt
the same instrumental variable strategy as in the case of China. We use the average
tari¤s of four developing countries Brazil, Indonesia, India and South Africa 
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for the year 1999 and year 1996 as an instrument for the Taiwan tari¤s in 1999
and 1996, respectively. These results are shown in columns 5 and 6 and suggest
that our results remain unchanged in both cases. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
indicates that the endogeneity of pre-accession tari¤ is not a concern for these
results.
Counterfactual 1 We next present two counterfactual exercises along the
lines of those presented in Chapter 3 to verify our results. One issue with the evi-
dence documented in Table 4.2 is whether our measure of the threat of retaliation
is actually capturing retaliation or some unobserved product characteristics that
happen to be correlated with our measure of retaliation. Since the rules regarding
subsidies and countervailing measures became binding only when Taiwan entered
the WTO, our measure of retaliation against subsidies should not have the same
impact on tari¤s before Taiwan entered the WTO. In order to verify that this is
not the case, we reestimate specications similar to those presented in Table 4.2,
but using an earlier sample.
The results of our rst counterfactual exercise are reported in Table 4.3. The
dependent variable in these regressions is the change in Taiwans tari¤s between
1996 and 1999 (Tari¤1999-Tari¤1996), which is regressed on the CVD indicator
and on the Taiwans tari¤ in 1992.95 While the rst column corresponds to the
similar specication as in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.2, the second column adds a
dummy that takes the value one if tari¤s in 1996 were positive. Similarly, we add
industry xed e¤ects (3 digit ISIC) in column 3 and present the results from IV
estimation in column 4. As expected, in all these cases the coe¢ cient on CVD is
95 Note that, we use a similar period of 3 years for calculating the change in tari¤s for the
counterfactual exercise, in order to be consistent with the one in our baseline specications.
Since, Taiwans tari¤s in 1997 are not reported in TRAINS database we picked 1996 and 1999
to calculate this change. However, one possible explanation for the result in this counterfactual
is that the tari¤s for Taiwan did not change much during this period. Our counterfactual results
remain the same if we take a longer sample period e.g. 1992-1999.
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insignicant. Hence, the results indicate that our measure does capture the threat
of retaliation against subsidies associated with accession to the WTO.
Counterfactual 2 A second potential issue with the evidence presented in
Table 4.2, and implicitly with our measure of the threat of retaliation, is that our
results might be driven by some other exogenous shock that a¤ected the tari¤s for
these products around the world during this period and has nothing to with the
accession to the WTO and the SCM rules. In Table 4.4 we present evidence that
this is not the case. In column 1 of Table 4.4 we replicate the baseline results from
column 2 of Table 4.2 for comparison. In order to capture the product specic
e¤ects on tari¤s around the world (or at least on the tari¤s in similar countries)
during this time, we include in the regression the average of the change in tari¤s
during this period for the four developing countries mentioned earlier Brazil,
Indonesia, India and South Africa. Our qualitative results remain unchanged.
In fact the magnitude of our coe¢ cient of interest slightly increases, while the
coe¢ cient on the average change for these developing countries is insignicant.
In column 3 of Table 4.4 we take a slightly di¤erent approach and regress the
average change in tari¤s in these four countries on our measure of retaliation to
verify if it explains the change in tari¤s around the world and hence has nothing
to do with accession per se. The coe¢ cient on CVD has the opposite sign and is
signicant, indicating that, if there was such a common shock that was correlated
with our proxy for the threat of retaliation, that lead to a downward bias in our
estimates.96 Finally, in column 4 of Table 4.4 we include a counterpart to the
results of counterfactual 1 (presented with the pre-accession sample), where we
regress the change in tari¤s between 1996 and 1999, and also include the average
tari¤ during that time period for these countries. Again the results support our
96 Note that this is consistent with our results presented in the earlier column that including
the average change as another explanatory variable increased the magnitude of our estimates.
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earlier conclusion.
4.4.2 Robustness and Other results
In the previous sub-section we presented evidence in support of our main hypoth-
esis that as the country enters the WTO, there will be an increase in tari¤s for
those products that face a threat of retaliation against subsidies versus those that
did not. As on average tari¤s go down with accession due to various other reasons,
we looked at the relative decline in tari¤s during this period, i.e. we showed that
tari¤s did not decline as fast for those products that faced a threat of retaliation
against subsidies as for the others, ceteris paribus. However, strictly speaking,
our model suggested that the tari¤s should go up with accession. In our data we
see that even during the period between 2000 and 2003 there were indeed roughly
400 products for which there was a strict increase in tari¤s. If we include the
products with no change in tari¤s during this period, there were a total of 2075
products for which the change in tari¤s was weakly positive.
In Table 4.5a we present the evidence using a similar specication as for that
in equation (24) but using only those products for which tari¤s did not decline
during the period under consideration, 2000-2003. Since these observations are
censored from below at zero we use Tobit model instead of OLS for our estimations.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.5a use tari¤s for 1999 and 1992 respectively as a
measure of pre-accession tari¤s. As we can see, our results remain qualitatively
unchanged: the threat of retaliation against subsidies has a positive impact on
tari¤s. This result remains unchanged as we add industry xed e¤ects (column
3) or control for change in tari¤s across other four developing countries over this
time period (column 4). Finally, Table 4.5b corresponds to counterfactual 1 we
use the sample prior to Taiwans accession to the WTO and nd that we do not
get the same results in the pre-accession sample.
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Note, however, that unlike in the case of the OLS results, one needs to go
further to interpret the magnitude of the Tobit coe¢ cients. The Tobit coe¢ cients
on an independent variable include both the marginal impact on the probability
of the dependent variable being uncensored and the impact of the independent
variable on the dependent variable conditional on the latter being observed (see
for example, Roncek (1992)). Using the results presented in column 2 of Table
4.5a we nd that the threat of retaliation increases the probability of getting
a strict increase in tari¤s by 0.14 percentage points. The results also show that,
conditional on there being an increase in tari¤s, tari¤s increased by 1.83 percentage
points for those products that faced a positive threat of retaliation. Thus these
results support our hypothesis.
Table 4.6 presents further evidence that our results are robust to alternative
specications and sample selection. One concern with the dependent variable
is that, because it reects the change in tari¤s as Taiwan entered the WTO, the
actual extent of the decline was not in the hands of Taiwan, as the decline in tari¤s
is negotiated prior to the accession and, hence, would reect foreign interests as
well. This concern is valid to some extent, even though (a) we are using applied
tari¤s, whereas the negotiations take place on the level of bound tari¤s and (b)
the negotiations also involve a period of implementation over which the level of
tari¤s would be decreased to the level of the nal bound.
While this is admittedly a cause for concern, we are not sure about the direction
in which it would bias our coe¢ cient of interest. In those cases where the foreign
lobby is stronger, such that the negotiated level of tari¤ binding is less than that
in the year 2000, tari¤s will have to decrease to the level of binding even in the
presence of a threat of retaliation against subsidy. On the other hand, if the
domestic interests in the acceding country are powerful enough, then the level of
tari¤ bindings itself will be so chosen as to be the same or higher than the existing
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applied rate (WTO (2005), page 10).
In order to capture the extent by which the decline in tari¤s was due to the ne-
gotiated commitment, we construct a dummy variable, Bound_Accession_Document.
This dummy variable takes the value 1 if Taiwans applied tari¤s in 2003 were
greater than or equal to the level of the bound tari¤s on the date of accession
(as given in its accession document) and zero otherwise. Since in these cases the
tari¤ rates were higher than the negotiated bound rate even after accession, at
least part of the decline in tari¤s during this period would be due to a lower bound
rate.
The evidence in column 1 shows that, not only is the coe¢ cient on CVD still
positive and signicant at the 1% level, but even the size of the coe¢ cient is similar
to that obtained earlier. We also nd that the coe¢ cient on the bound dummy
variable is positive and signicant, showing that these products have experienced
a relatively lower decrease in tari¤s since they are still above the bound rate. In
column 2 we repeat this exercise by including industry xed e¤ects. Our results
remain unchanged, even though, as in Table 4.2, the size and the signicance of
the coe¢ cient of interest is slightly lower.
In column 3 of this table we use an alternative measure to capture the e¤ect
of bound tari¤s. In this case we create a dummy (Not_Bound_Trains) that
takes the value 1 if tari¤s in 2000 were strictly less than the level of nal bound
tari¤s according to the TRAINS database. Since these tari¤s were already below
the nal ceiling level, even before Taiwan joined the WTO, they might share
common unobserved characteristics that we should control for. Our results remain
unchanged even after including this dummy.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 4.6 we present evidence that our
results are robust to sample selection. Since the SCM agreement primarily deals
with industrial subsidies, while the subsidies in the agricultural sector being also
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guided by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, in column 4 we restrict our sample
to the products belonging to the manufacturing sector. Next, in column 5 we
restrict our sample to products belonging to only those three digit ISIC industries
that had at least one product that faced a threat of retaliation. Our results remain
unchanged in both cases. Hence, we can conclude that the evidence presented in
this chapter in support of our hypothesis is robust.97,98
4.5 Conclusion
One of the most important rules in the WTO is the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures. This agreement guides subsidies that a member
government can provide, as well as, guides the retaliatory actions available to
other WTO members against the subsidizing member if these subsidies hurt their
interests. It is especially important to understand the impact of the WTO subsidy
rules as the agricultural subsidies given by the developed countries to their farmers
is currently one of the leading contentious issues in the ongoing Doha development
round.
That subsidies have increasingly become an important issue in the multilateral
trade can be gauged from the fact that, the 2006 WTO world trade report focuses
exclusively on the subsidies, on the impact of subsidies on trade and the role of
the WTO in its regulation. Despite this increasing interest in matters related to
the subsidies, and the recognition that they are an alternative measure of trade
barriers just like the tari¤s, the choice of tari¤s and subsidies and the impact of
the WTO rules is still unclear.
97 Also in results not shown here, but available on request, we show that the results are not
driven by presence of any outliers.
98 Unlike for China, for Taiwan we did not nd robust results for the case of the interaction
model. In fact, in most cases the coe¢ cient on exports was insignicant and in some cases posi-
tive. This result is consistent with that in Liu (2002), who nds that export-oriented industries
experienced lower tari¤ reductions over the period 1992-95. According to Liu (2002), this is
probably because the export-oriented industries in Taiwan had already reached a low level of
protection.
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Recognizing this point, the 2006 WTO world trade report mentions that
"...The extent to which stronger subsidy rules have inhibited commitments to
reduce tari¤s is obviously an empirical matter in respect of which we have no ev-
idence. But the essential point that choices among policy alternatives can matter
is well taken"(page 196).
In this chapter we provide such an evidence using the case of Taiwans accession
to the WTO in January 2002. We show that the WTO SCM rules and the
associated threat of retaliation against subsidies had a substantial impact on the
extent of tari¤ liberalization. Our evidence suggests that as Taiwan entered the
WTO the products which faced a threat of retaliation against subsidies saw a
relative increase in tari¤s of about 1 percentage points or an increase of about
65% as compared to those that did not face this threat. We provide interesting
counterfactuals and various robustness exercises to support our claim that the
impacts we measure is indeed due to the threat of retaliation.
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APPENDIX
A Appendices for Chapter 2
A.1 Equilibrium with Collection costs
According to the model presented in Chapter 2 we found that, when the country
is outside the WTO, only subsidies will be used in the equilibrium and there will
be no tari¤s. This is because we wanted to highlight the commitment mechanism
associated with the WTO rules, hence, we abstracted from any other potential
roles for subsidies and tari¤s, apart from as a means to make transfers to the
special interest groups. However, in reality there are several other reasons for the
existence of tari¤s. For example, in the case of a large country, tari¤s might serve
to improve a countrys terms-of-trade vis-a-vis the other members.
Similarly, tari¤s might arise in the equilibrium, even for a small country, if it is
costly to collect revenue to nance subsidies (Aizenman (1987), Corden (1974)).
These tax collection costs can potentially be very high especially for small de-
veloping countries like the one assumed here. Here, we take in to account the
collection costs for generating revenues to see if our results are a¤ected in any
way.
Collection of tari¤s is generally thought to be relatively less costly as com-
pared to any other form of taxes. As Corden (1974) writes "..."The central point
is that collection costs for trade taxes are generally much lower than for other
taxes. This is mainly because foreign trade usually ows through a few ports or
bottllenecks(italics), and even when it does not, it is easier to police a border
and collect taxes on goods passing across it than to seek out a large number of
individual taxpayers, whether persons or rms, or to ensure that they produce
accurate tax returns. The point is really quite obvious..." (page 40).
Hence we assume that there are no collection costs in case of tari¤s, while
raising revenue through other types of taxes are costly. Specically, we assume
that in order to nance a subsidy equal to t the government has to raise (1 + ) 
t in revenues. To leave the model otherwise unchanged, we assume that the
government raises this revenue through lump-sum taxes.
The equilibrium levels of lobby goods and the transfers (tari¤s and subsidies)
are determined by the Nash bargaining between the government and each indi-
vidual lobby. Hence, reproducing equation (6) here, the equilibrium levels of C; t
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and  is determined by:
Max
C;t;
F = (G  g0)(V   v0)(1 ) s:t: G  g0; V  v0 (25)
where the governments and the lobbys utility function is given by (for the case
of before joining the WTO)





V (C; t; ) = l + (t; )  C
Note that, for a given level of t due to the collection costs incurred in nancing the
subsidies, the governments utility is lower, ceteris paribus, as compared to that
in equation (7). On the other hand, the utility of the lobby remains unchanged as,
given our assumption of concentrated ownership, each individual lobby has very
little to contribute to the total tax collection.

























where the "s are the elasticities, and z the inverse import penetration, as dened
in the text. We can see that, unlike earlier, the tari¤ is positive even before joining
the WTO. Furthermore, the level of tari¤s will be higher the more costly it is to
nance subsidies. Also note that, if we set the collection cost  to zero, we get
back to our original equilibrium.
Now, once the country accedes to the WTO, the lobby faces retaliation against
subsidies with probability . Hence the lobbys utility will now be given by,
V (C; t; ) = l + (t; )  C   R(t), while the governments utility remains as in
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In order to verify that the government might gain from joining the WTO even
in the presence of the collection costs we use the numerical simulations provided
in Chapter 2, however we include an explicit cost to using subsidies. Hence, we
assume the production function to be given by a Cobb-Douglas function y =
Ak1 l, and the consumers subutility of consuming the non-numeraire good by
a quadratic function u(x) = 10x   b
2
x2. We also assume the cost of retaliation
to be increasing and convex R(t) = Bt, and that the contribution function that
enters the governments utility function is given by, 	(C) = Cn where n 2 (0; 1).
A su¢ cient condition that the government gains from joining the WTO is if the











In Table 2.A1 we show that these conditions will be satised for low values of the
parameter n i.e. when the rate of decrease in the governments utility due to an
increase in lobby goods is higher. Recall that it is the same condition that we
found in the text as well.
Table 2.A2 and Table 2.A3 reproduce other results from the text for the case
when collection costs are present. According to Table 2.A2 we nd that, indeed
in the presence of collection costs to nance subsidies, there will be positive tari¤s
in equilibrium even before the countrys accession to the WTO. We also nd that
once the country joins the WTO and hence faces a positive threat of retaliation
against subsidies, the subsidy goes down while the tari¤ goes up for all values
of the parameter n. Note that the total protection (t + ) also goes down with
accession in each case. Finally, as shown in Table 2.A3, these e¤ects of the threat
of retaliation () are higher, the higher the level of . Hence, we can see that our
results remain unchanged even after the inclusion of collection costs to nance
subsidies.
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A.2 Case When the Retaliation A¤ects the Government
not the Lobby
In the text we have assumed that, as the country joins the WTO, there is a
positive probability () of retaliation against subsidies. We assumed that these
retaliation by other WTO members impose a cost R(t) on the lobby, and that
these costs are increasing and convex in the level of the subsidy. For simplicity,
we assumed that the retaliation leaves the governments utility una¤ected. In this
section we show that our main results remain unchanged even if we make the
other extreme assumption: that the retaliation is costly for the government but
leaves the lobbys utility unchanged.
Hence, under this scenario, the equilibrium levels of C; t and  are determined
by the Nash bargaining between the lobby and the government as given in equation
(6), except that now the respective utilities for the government and the lobby are
given by
G = 1 + (t; ) +   [d ()  0(t; )]  t0(t; ) + S() + 1
a
	(C)  R(t)
V = V (C; t; ) = l + (t; )  C (A.29)
where  is the probability of retaliation against subsidies in a given sector, and
R(t) is the cost to the government due to the retaliation. The equilibrium in this





























Thus we nd that, similar to the results given in Chapter 2, there will be an
increase in tari¤s for those products that face a positive probability of retalia-
tion against subsidies, if the retaliation is costly to the government but leaves
the lobbys utility unchanged. We can also verify that our other results also re-
main unchanged. For instance, Table 2.A.4 provides results from the numerical
example to illustrate the bargaining position improvement codition due to the
WTO subsidy commitment. Consistent with our previous results, we nd that
this condition is more likely to be satised for low values of parameter n.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Rewriting equation (14), the optimized value of the Nash product in terms of the





The rst order condition will be given by,
LG :  (G  g0) 1 + (1  ) (G  g0) 
 
G = 0 (32)
Solving this equation we get the usual Nash bargaining equilibrium condition,





G is the inverse of the slope of the Pareto frontier.
Thus this expression says that the Nash equilibrium of the bargaining game in the
utility space will be such that the slope of the Pareto frontier at the equilibrium
will be equal (in absolute value) to the slope of the ray from the disagreement
point to the equilibrium.
Totally di¤erentiating the above rst order condition and using the implicit
































Thus, plugging this in the expression for dG
d
and simplifying, we get,
dG
d

















































The proof of the second part is outlined in the text. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof: Interior solution exists for C, t and 
In the following we provide proof of existence of interior solution for the Nash
bargaining over policies in the second stage for the case when  > 0. The proof
for the case when the country is not a member is similar.
Since, we know that the Nash bargaining solution will lie on the Pareto frontier
we can show existence of interior solution by showing that the equation for Pareto
frontier involves positive values of C, t and  .
The Pareto frontier can be given by solving,
Max
(C;t;)0
V (t;  ; C;) sub:to: G(t;  ; C;)  G (33)
we can write the above problem as




 t0(ps) + S(pd) + 1
a
	(C)  G] + C + t+ 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions after simplication can be in terms of the rst order
conditions
C :  1 + 1
a
	0 +  = 0; C = 0;   0; C  0
t : 0   R0 +  ( 00   t00) +  = 0; t = 0;   0; t  0
 : 0 +  ( (d0   00)  t00) +  = 0;  = 0;   0;   0
 :













We can rule out the corner solutions using the properties of the functions as
assumed in the model.
Case 1 : C = t =  = 0
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From f.o.c. with respect to  ; 0 +  = 0.
But   0. Contradiction.
Case 2 : C =  = 0; t > 0
t > 0 =>  = 0: From f.o.c. with respect to C; 1 +  1
a
	0 +  = 0.
But 	0(0) =1. Contradiction.
Case 3 : C = t = 0;  > 0
Not possible due to the same reason.
Case 4 : C > 0; t = 0;  > 0
C > 0 =>  = 0;  > 0 =>  = 0: From f.o.c. with respect to C =>  = a
	0
f.o.c. with respect to t => 0 + a
	0 ( 
00) +  = 0
and f.o.c. with respect to  => 0 + a
	0 ( (d
0   00)) = 0
Thus, from these two equations we get,    a
	0 d
0 = 0.
But   0. Contradiction.
Case 5 : C > 0; t > 0;  = 0
C > 0 =>  = 0; t > 0 =>  = 0:From f.o.c. with respect to C =>  = a
	0
f.o.c. with respect to t => (0   R0) + a
	0 ( t
00) = 0
and f.o.c. with respect to  => 0 + a
	0 ( t
00) +  = 0
Thus, from these two equations we get,  R0    = 0.
But   0. Contradiction.
Case 6 : G(t;  ; C;) > G
G(t;  ; C;) > G =>  = 0
From f.o.c. with respect to  ; 0 +  = 0.
But   0. Contradiction.
Thus from the above exercise we see that the only possible equilibrium is one
where all variables (C; t; ) are strictly positive and where the constraint on the
governments utility is binding; the case that we discuss in the text.
A.5 Su¢ cient condition for increase in tari¤s with proba-
bility of retaliation







0 are met, then they are su¢ cient to ensure that an increase in the threat of re-
taliation () will lead to an increase in tari¤s.
We use Cramers rule to get the su¢ cient condition for increase in tari¤s with
the threat of retaliation, . By totally di¤erentiating the rst order conditions of
the Nash bargaining problem in the second stage, when country has joined the
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0 (v   v0) g gh g0
g0h ( 00 + gh0) ( 00 + g00)
g00 ( 00 + g00) (d0   00)+gh0
375
where g = 1
a
	0; g0 = 1
a
	00; h = (0   R0) and h0 = (00   R00). Expanding
the above determinant, canceling out common terms and collecting terms we can
rewrite it as
jAj = ( 00 + g00) [(g0 (v   v0)  g) (d0   gR00)  (g0R0) (gR0)]
+ (g0) (g0) d0 (2R0   0) + (g0) (g00) gR00
 d0 (g0)R0 (g)R0   d0 (g)R00 (g0 (v   v0)  g)
In general it is not possible to sign this expression unless one assumes explicit
functional forms as the expressions involve a term containing (v   v0). How-
ever, notice that except for the rst two terms in the above expression, all the
other expressions are negative. The rst two expressions will also be negative, if






 0: Thus these two conditions are su¢ cient to
ensure that the determinant of matrix A is negative.
Now using Cramers rule, d
d
= jBjjAj ; where,
jBj=

g0 (v   v0)  g gh gR
 g0R0 ( 00 + gh0) gR0
g00 ( 00 + g00) 0

jBj = gR [( g0R0) ( 00 + g00) + (g00) gR00]  (gR0)
 [(g0 (v   v0)  g) ( 00 + g00)  (g00) gh]





























   
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Before Accession (No Retaliation): 













Figure 2.1: Equilibrium After Accession (Positive Probability of 
Retaliation): 
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Figure 2.2: Gains to the Government from Joining the WTO (SCM): 
Government’s Utility and Probability of Retaliation 
(0, g0)
Gmax |μ=0








   
Figure 2.3a: Numerical Example to Check if the Bargaining Position 
Improvement Condition due to the WTO Subsidy Commitment Holds 
 
The condition will be satisfied if the following holds: 
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Production Function: q   Ak l1−





Retaliation Cost: θBttR =)(  
Government's Utility from lobby goods:   C  Cn
 
Parameter Values: 
A = a = b = p = k = 1; α = 0.5, B = 0.5, μ = 0.5, θ = 2 
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Figure 2.3b: Sensitivity Check for Different Parameter Values 
 
Case μ = 0 
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Case μ = 0.3 
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Case μ = 1 
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A = a = b = p = k = 1; α = 0.5, B = 0.5, θ = 2 
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Table 2.1: Equilibrium Policies for the Numerical Example 
n Subsidies Tariffs Subsidies Tariffs
Subsidies + 
Tariffs
0.1 1.804 0.000 1.045 0.538 1.584
0.2 1.731 0.000 0.990 0.492 1.482
0.3 1.706 0.000 0.952 0.461 1.413
0.4 1.717 0.000 0.926 0.439 1.365
0.5 1.769 0.000 0.908 0.425 1.333
0.6 1.878 0.000 0.898 0.417 1.315
0.7 2.084 0.000 0.898 0.416 1.314
0.8 2.506 0.000 0.908 0.425 1.333
0.9 3.676 0.000 0.937 0.448 1.384











+ Tariffs Subsidies Tariffs
Subsidies + 
Tariffs
0 1.804 0.000 1.804 3.676 0.000 3.676
0.3 1.337 0.359 1.696 1.392 0.382 1.775
0.5 1.045 0.538 1.584 0.937 0.448 1.384
0.8 0.749 0.694 1.443 0.618 0.489 1.107
1 0.621 0.754 1.376 0.501 0.503 1.004
Parameters : A = a = b = p = k = 1, α = 0.5, B = 0.5, θ = 2
n = 0.1 n = 0.9
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Table 2.A1: Verification that the Bargaining Position Improvement 
Condition due to the WTO Subsidy Commitment Holds in Presence of 




Parameters : A = a = b = p = k = 1, α = 0.5, B = 0.5, μ = 0.5, θ = 2, β = 0.2
00
|lim >>− μγ γd
dG
00
|lim =>− μγ γd
dG
 
The condition will be satisfied if the following holds: 
0000







Production Function: q   Ak l1−





Retaliation Cost: θBttR =)(  
Government's Utility from lobby goods:   C  Cn
 
Parameter Values: 
A = a = b = p = k = 1; α = 0.5, B = 0.5, μ = 0.5, θ = 2 
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Table 2.A2: Equilibrium Policies for the Numerical Example in 






0.1 1.150 0.239 1.389 0.671 0.619 1.290
0.2 1.070 0.230 1.300 0.622 0.567 1.189
0.3 1.020 0.224 1.245 0.587 0.530 1.117
0.4 0.991 0.221 1.212 0.560 0.502 1.062
0.5 0.979 0.220 1.199 0.539 0.480 1.019
0.6 0.987 0.221 1.208 0.522 0.464 0.985
0.7 1.022 0.225 1.246 0.509 0.451 0.961
0.8 1.100 0.233 1.334 0.502 0.444 0.946
0.9 1.278 0.253 1.532 0.500 0.442 0.942






Table 2.A3: Comparative Static Exercise with respect to the Threat of 
Retaliation in Presence of Collection Costs 
μ Subsidies Tariffs
Subsidies 
+ Tariffs Subsidies Tariffs
Subsidies + 
Tariffs
0 1.150 0.239 1.389 1.278 0.253 1.532
0.3 0.835 0.502 1.337 0.670 0.402 1.073
0.5 0.671 0.619 1.290 0.500 0.442 0.942
0.8 0.504 0.727 1.231 0.359 0.474 0.833
1 0.429 0.772 1.201 0.302 0.487 0.789
Parameters : A = a = b = p = k = 1, α = 0.5, B = 0.5, θ = 2, β = 0.2




Table 2.A4: Verification that the Bargaining Position Improvement 
Condition due to the WTO Subsidy Commitment Holds When 




Parameters : A = a = b = p = k = 1, α = 0.5, B = 0.5, μ = 0.5, θ = 2, β = 0.2
00
|lim >>− μγ γd
dG
00
|lim =>− μγ γd
dG
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Table 3.1: Sectoral Distribution of CVD Measures By Reporting 
Member (01/01/95 - 30/06/04) 
Reporting Member / HS Sectors I II III IV V VI VII IX XI XV XVI Total
Argentina  0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Australia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Brazil 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Canada 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 7
Chile 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Costa Rica 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
European Community 1 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 4 7 2 21
Mexico  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 7
New Zealand 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Peru 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 4
United States 1 1 0 2 4 1 1 1 0 32 1 44
Venezuela 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 4 8 3 12 4 3 7 1 5 54 3 104
The sectors refer to one digit Harmonized Schedule sectors.
Source: www.wto.org  
The list of Sectors as classified in the Harmonized Schedule (HS) 
Section Description
 I Live animals; animal products
 II Vegetable products
 III Animal or vegetable fats; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes
 IV Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits and vinegar; tobacco
 V Mineral products 
 VI Products of the chemical or allied industries
 VII Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof
 VIII Raw hides and skins, leather, travel goods, handbags and similar containers;
 IX Wood and articles of wood; manufactures of straw; basket ware and wickerwork
 X Pulp of wood; paper and paperboard and articles thereof
 XI Textiles and textile articles 
 XII Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, feathers and articles made therewith; etc.
 XIII Articles of stone, plaster, cement; ceramic products; glass and glassware
 XIV Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, jewellery; coin thereof;
 XV Base metals and articles of base metal
 XVI Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; parts thereof; 
 XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment
 XVIII Instruments, apparatus; clocks and watches; musical instruments; parts and accessories thereof
 XIX Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof
 XX Miscellaneous manufactured articles
 XXI Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques  
 
Note: The names of the industries are abbreviated for brevity. See the source for complete list of 
products in each sector. 
source: www.wto.org 
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Table 3.2: Average Tariff in (Chinese) Two Digit Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
Chi2digit Industrial Name Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Coef. Var.
13 Food Processing 29.44 23.26 19.79 13.93 9.74 11.91 0.82
14 Food Manufacturing 28.11 19.21 18.34 8.22 9.11 16.30 0.56
15 Beverage Manufacturing 57.38 15.59 29.70 16.18 26.99 15.77 1.71
16 Tobacco Processing 65.00 0.00 45.80 15.59 22.00 16.49 1.33
17 Textile Industry 21.62 7.63 13.65 5.69 7.99 4.90 1.63
18 Garments and Other Fiber Products 26.72 2.99 19.43 2.34 7.34 2.03 3.62
19 Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 20.56 6.10 18.22 4.16 6.36 4.00 1.59
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and St 12.06 6.24 5.65 3.82 6.34 3.62 1.75
21 Furniture Manufacturing 19.68 4.42 10.24 5.12 9.44 5.92 1.59
22 Papermaking and Paper Products 14.85 8.80 7.44 4.96 7.32 5.11 1.43
23 Printing and Record Medium Reproduction 18.11 6.58 9.52 3.44 8.59 3.22 2.66
24 Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods 16.27 3.93 15.23 3.52 1.05 1.56 0.67
25 Petroleum Processing and Coking 8.94 3.36 7.30 2.13 1.67 1.74 0.96
26 Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 10.80 6.14 7.96 6.36 3.38 4.35 0.78
27 Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 9.60 2.03 4.39 1.00 5.18 1.60 3.24
28 Chemical Fiber 14.89 2.81 9.11 2.02 5.77 2.42 2.39
29 Rubber Products 15.75 6.65 12.45 4.95 3.89 3.55 1.10
30 Plastic Products 19.41 3.66 13.23 5.43 6.18 3.48 1.78
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 17.48 8.24 13.73 6.09 3.99 4.89 0.82
32 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 9.23 4.28 5.69 3.07 3.55 2.56 1.39
33 Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 7.18 3.47 5.07 2.29 2.38 2.07 1.15
34 Metal Products 13.99 5.16 11.44 4.53 2.65 2.96 0.89
35 Ordinary Machinery 15.16 5.95 9.98 4.88 5.16 3.49 1.48
36 Special Purpose Equipment 12.46 3.82 7.72 3.05 4.73 3.74 1.26
37 Transport Equipment 23.76 23.10 14.10 12.62 9.50 12.24 0.78
40 Electric Equipment and Machinery 17.18 7.37 11.39 7.92 5.83 4.40 1.33
41 Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment 16.78 10.24 10.11 10.17 7.39 5.03 1.47
42 Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery 16.10 5.92 10.15 7.01 5.95 4.33 1.37




Chi2digit = Chinese 2 digit industries.  The tariffs with zero initial tariffs were dropped before 
calculating these averages. Simple average of the six digit HS tariff data from TRAINS. 
Source: Authors calculation 
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Table 3.3: Baseline Model - Effect of Probability of Retaliation on 
Change in Tariff 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 2003 - Tariff 2000) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (OLS)2 (IV)
CVD   0.822*** 0.814*** 0.578*** 1.007* 0.523**
[0.242] [0.241] [0.224] [0.528] [0.231]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.422*** -0.424*** -0.398*** -0.436*** -0.352***







Number of firms 0.256**
[0.095]
Share of state owned enterprises -0.031**
[0.015]




ln(Import from rest of the world) -0.376***
[0.095]
Constant 1.432*** 0.000 1.098*** -1.432 0.247
[0.279] [0.000] [0.260] [1.674] [0.370]
Observations 4659 4659 4350 4087 4442
Adj R2 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.55 0.48
Shea Partial R2 0.396
Test of Excluded Instrument, p 0.000
Overidentification, Hansen J test, p 0.162  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Centered R2 reported in case of IV regression. 
CVD is an indicator that takes value one if a countervailing duty (CVD) has been imposed between 
1995-2001 in that product by any of the four trading partners of China – Australia, Canada, EU and US 
against any existing WTO member, and zero otherwise. Positive tariffs is a dummy that takes the value 
one if the tariffs were positive (not zero) in year 2000 to begin with, and zero otherwise. All other 
regressors, except wage, are from year 1999. The wage data is for 2002. 
1. Restricts sample to products belonging to industrial sector (mining and manufacturing industries). 
2. Clustered at industry level as the political economy controls are available only at the aggregate 
industry level. 
Instrumented variable: Pre-accession tariff (tariff in China for year 1999) 
Instruments used: (a) avg_tariff - Average tariff in year 1999 of four developing countries with similar 
per capita income as of China - Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa - and (b) tariffTWN - tariff in 
1999 for Taiwan. 
The test of excluded instruments reports the test for relevance of the instruments in the corresponding 
first stage regression. The associated value of the F-statistics is F(2, 4438) = 355.26. Additionally both 
the Anderson-canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test statistic and the Cragg-Donald statistics 
suggest that the equation is identified (p-val 0.00). The first stage centered R2 is 0.41. Note that the 
Shea partial R2 reported above is the same as the squared partial correlation between the excluded 
instruments and the endogenous regressor when there is a single endogenous regressor.  
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Table 3.4a: Counterfactual 1 for the Baseline Model – Using Pre-
Accession Sample 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 2000 - Tariff 1997) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (OLS)2 (IV)
CVD   -1.724*** -1.727*** -1.634*** -1.107 -1.618***
[0.197] [0.197] [0.195] [0.678] [0.167]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.019 -0.065***







Number of firms 0.049***
[0.016]
Share of State Owned Enterprises 0.037**
[0.018]
Capital Labor ratio 0.266
[1.155]




Constant 0.386*** 0.000*** 0.358*** -1.818** 1.188***
[0.083] [0.000] [0.063] [0.724] [0.159]
Observations 4872 4872 4539 4441 4683
Adj R2 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.04
Shea Partial R2 0.415
Test of Excluded Instrument, p 0.000
Overidentification, Hansen J test, p 0.00  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Centered R2 reported in case of IV regression. 
CVD is an indicator that takes value one if a countervailing duty (CVD) has been imposed between 
1995-2001 in that product by any of the four trading partners of China – Australia, Canada, EU and US 
against any existing WTO member, and zero otherwise. Positive tariffs is a dummy that takes the value 
one if the tariffs were positive (not zero) in year 1997 to begin with, and zero otherwise. All other 
regressors, except wage, are from year 1996. The wage data is for 2002. 
1. Restricts sample to products belonging to industrial sector (mining and manufacturing industries). 
2. Clustered at industry level as the political economy controls are available only at the aggregate 
industry level. 
Instrumented variable: Pre-accession tariff (tariff in China for year 1996) 
Instruments used: (a) avg_tariff - Average tariff in year 1996 of four developing countries with similar 
per capita income as of China - Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa - and (b) tariffTWN - tariff in 
1996 for Taiwan. 
The test of excluded instruments reports the test for relevance of the instruments in the corresponding 
first stage regression. The associated value of the F-statistics is F(2, 4679) = 427.47. Additionally both 
the Anderson-canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test statistic and the Cragg-Donald statistics 
suggest that the equation is identified (p-val 0.00). The first stage centered R2 is 0.42. Note that the 
Shea partial R2 reported above is the same as the squared partial correlation between the excluded 
instruments and the endogenous regressor when there is a single endogenous regressor.  
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Table 3.4b: Counterfactual 2 for the Baseline Model – Using Average 
Change in Tariffs for Similar Countries during the Sample Period 
(2000-2003) 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 2000 - Tariff 1997) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (OLS)2
CVD   0.822*** 0.728*** 0.019
[0.242] [0.235] [0.083]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.422*** -0.433*** -0.087***
[0.019] [0.020] [0.004]
Change in Average Tariffs -0.351***
(BRA, IDN, IND, ZAF) [0.091]
Constant 1.432*** 0.995*** -0.435***
[0.279] [0.265] [0.067]
Observations 4659 4622 4792
Adj R2 0.48 0.50 0.22  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1. Includes average change in tariff between 2000 and 2003  for four developing countries - Brazil, 
South Africa, India & Indonesia. 
2. The dependent variable is the change in average tariffs of the above countries between 2000 and 
2003. The pre-accession tariffs is average tariff for these countries for 1999. 
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Table 3.5: Interaction Model - Effect of Retaliation Depends on the 
Cost of Retaliation 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 2003 - Tariff 2000) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (OLS) (OLS)2 (IV)
CVD 0.484* 0.149 0.556** 0.598 0.223
[0.283] [0.241] [0.253] [0.520] [0.263]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.391*** -0.359*** -0.414*** -0.403*** -0.331***
[0.025] [0.019] [0.020] [0.028] [0.024]
Export to the world -0.186***
[0.047]
CVD X Export to the world 0.408***
[0.099]
Export to Sample Partners3 -0.377*** -0.391*** -0.255*** -0.395***
[0.102] [0.107] [0.067] [0.110]
CVD X Export to Sample Partners 0.630*** 0.662*** 0.412** 0.607***





Number of firms 0.238**
[0.094]
Share of state owned enterprises -0.034**
[0.016]




ln(Import from rest of the world) -0.363***
[0.095]
Constant 1.181*** 0.699** 1.394*** -1.279 0.163
[0.371] [0.286] [0.296] [1.664] [0.396]
Observations 3911 3708 4498 3516 3813
Adj R2 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.43
Shea Partial R2 0.457
Test of Excluded Instrument, p 0.000
Overidentification, Hansen J test, p 0.446  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Centered R2 reported in case of IV regression. 
CVD is an indicator that takes value one if a countervailing duty (CVD) has been imposed between 
1995-2001 in that product by any of the four trading partners of China – Australia, Canada, EU and US 
against any existing WTO member, and zero otherwise. Positive tariffs is a dummy that takes the value 
one if the tariffs were positive (not zero) in year 2000 to begin with, and zero otherwise. All other 
regressors, except wage, are from year 1999. The wage data is for 2002. 
1. Restricts sample to products belonging to industrial sector (mining and manufacturing industries). 
2. Clustered at industry level as the political economy controls are available only at the aggregate 
industry level. 
3. China's total exports to Australia, Canada, EU and US. 
Instrumented variable: Pre-accession tariff (tariff in China for year 1999) 
Instruments used: (a) avg_tariff - Average tariff in year 1999 of four developing countries with similar 
per capita income as of China - Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa - and (b) tariffTWN - tariff in 
1999 for Taiwan. 
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The test of excluded instruments reports the test for relevance of the instruments in the corresponding 
first stage regression. The associated value of the F-statistics is F(2, 3807) = 306.25. Additionally both 
the Anderson-canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test statistic and the Cragg-Donald statistics 
suggest that the equation is identified (p-val 0.00). The first stage centered R2 is 0.48. Note that the 
Shea partial R2 reported above is the same as the squared partial correlation between the excluded 
instruments and the endogenous regressor when there is a single endogenous regressor.  
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Table 3.6: Counterfactual for the Interaction Model – Using Pre-
Accession Sample 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 2000 - Tariff 1997) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (OLS) (OLS)2 (IV)
CVD -1.864*** -1.829*** -1.710*** -1.225* -1.565***
[0.203] [0.203] [0.203] [0.652] [0.202]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.035*** -0.039*** -0.031*** -0.022 -0.077***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.014] [0.006]
Export to the world -0.049*
[0.029]
CVD X Export to the world -0.031
[0.115]
Export to Sample Partners3 0.097** 0.128*** 0.111 0.246***
[0.042] [0.044] [0.085] [0.073]
CVD X Export to Sample Partners -0.028 -0.047 -0.068 -0.065





Number of firms 0.047***
[0.014]
Share of state owned enterprises 0.038**
[0.019]




ln(Import from rest of the world) 0.119
[0.071]
Constant 0.408*** 0.458*** 0.429*** -1.732** 1.370***
[0.080] [0.082] [0.089] [0.786] [0.136]
Observations 3940 3729 4644 3729 3862
Adj R2 0.1 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.05
Shea Partial R2 0.442
Test of Excluded Instrument, p 0.000
Overidentification, Hansen J test, p 0.00  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Centered R2 reported in case of IV regression. 
CVD is an indicator that takes value one if a countervailing duty (CVD) has been imposed between 
1995-2001 in that product by any of the four trading partners of China – Australia, Canada, EU and US 
against any existing WTO member, and zero otherwise. Positive tariffs is a dummy that takes the value 
one if the tariffs were positive (not zero) in year 1996 to begin with, and zero otherwise. All other 
regressors, except wage, are from year 1996. The wage data is for 2002. 
1. Restricts sample to products belonging to industrial sector (mining and manufacturing industries). 
2. Clustered at industry level as the political economy controls are available only at the aggregate 
industry level. 
3. China's total exports to Australia, Canada, EU and US. 
Instrumented variable: Pre-accession tariff (tariff in China for year 1996) 
Instruments used: (a) avg_tariff - Average tariff in year 1996 of four developing countries with similar 
per capita income as of China - Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa - and (b) tariffTWN - tariff in 






The test of excluded instruments reports the test for relevance of the instruments in the corresponding 
first stage regression. The associated value of the F(2, 3856) = 399.64. Additionally both the 
Anderson-canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test statistic and the Cragg-Donald statistics suggest 
that the equation is identified (p-val 0.00). The first stage centered R2 is 0.46. Note that the Shea partial 
R2 reported above is the same as the squared partial correlation between the excluded instruments and 




Table 3.7: Predicted Probability Model  
Dependent Variable =                                        
(Tariff 2003 - Tariff 2000) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (IV) (OLS) (OLS)1 (IV)
Pr(Retaliation)2 -0.021 -0.052 -0.021 -0.019 -0.054 -0.026
[0.061] [0.053] [0.051] [0.098] [0.094] [0.087]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.357*** -0.386*** -0.334*** -0.357*** -0.386*** -0.334***
[0.036] [0.039] [0.049] [0.036] [0.040] [0.050]
Export to the world -0.247*** -0.215***
[0.059] [0.062]
Pr(Retaliation) X Export to the world 0.130*** 0.131**
[0.045] [0.052]
Export to Sample Partners3 -0.471*** -0.474*** -0.426*** -0.432***
[0.106] [0.108] [0.106] [0.108]
Pr(Retaliation) X Export to Sample Partners 0.171*** 0.166*** 0.170*** 0.165***
[0.052] [0.051] [0.061] [0.060]
Constant 0.725 1.117 0.312 0.713 1.098 0.31
[0.600] [0.664] [0.773] [0.595] [0.657] [0.767]
Observations 3708 4228 3635 3708 4228 3635
Adj R2 0.43 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.43
Shea Partial R2 0.521 0.518
Test of Excluded Instrument, p 0 0
Overidentification, Hansen J test, p 0.405 0.405
w/o Correcting for estimated regressor Corrected using Gawande (97) method
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All regressions account for clustering at 
industry level as the probability of retaliation is predicted at the aggregate industry level. Centered R2 reported in case of IV regression. 
1. Restricts sample to products belonging to industrial sector (mining and manufacturing industries). 
2. Pr(Retaliation) is the predicted coefficient on the industry dummies from the first stage regression -  jictjicttcijict WCVD εθϖϖπ ++++=  ; 
where 
 
   
iπ  = ii I∗ϖ where iϖ  is the full set of industry dummies and  is an indicator that indicates whether that industry has been targeted by a CVD 
in the past. 
iI
The results from the first stage regression are given in Table A1. Table A2 shows simple correlation between coefficients from different 
specifications. Here we use the coefficients from the first stage regression using the Linear Probability model, where CVD is regressed on industry, 
country and time dummies.  
3. China's total exports to Australia, Canada, EU and US. 
Instrumented variable: Pre-accession tariff (tariff in China for year 1996)  Instruments used: (a) avg_tariff - Average tariff in year 1996 of four 
developing countries with similar per capita income as of China - Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa - and (b) tariffTWN - tariff in 1996 for 
Taiwan. 
The test of excluded instruments reports the test for relevance of the instruments in the corresponding first stage regression. The associated value of 
the F-statistics for the results without correction is F( 2, 35) = 49.58 and the associated F-statistics for the set of results after correcting for the 
standard errors is F(2, 35) = 49.60. Additionally both the Anderson-canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test statistic and the Cragg-Donald 
statistics suggest that the equation is identified (p-val 0.00) for both sets of results. The first stage centered R2 is 0.52 in both cases. Note that the 
Shea partial R2 reported above is the same as the squared partial correlation between the excluded instruments and the endogenous regressor when 




   
Table 3.8: Robustness Exercises for the Interaction Model 
Dependent Variable =                               
(Tariff 2003 - Tariff 2000) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
4 (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
CVD 0.149 0.123 -0.723 -0.04 -0.743 -0.766
[0.681] [0.687] [0.828] [0.184] [0.545] [0.554]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.359*** -0.366*** -0.194*** -0.320*** -0.290*** -0.362***
[0.036] [0.037] [0.033] [0.006] [0.024] [0.034]
Export to Sample Partners1 -0.391*** -0.367*** -0.348 -0.348*** 0.403
[0.099] [0.096] [0.255] [0.070] [0.956]
CVD X Export to Sample Partners 0.663*** 0.641*** 0.991*** 0.910*** 6.192***





CVD X Mid-Total-Export 0.528
[0.682]
CVD X Hi-Total-Export 2.366***
[0.651]
Constant 0.702 0.876 -0.789 0.057 -0.365 0.639
[0.607] [0.621] [0.694] [0.120] [0.366] [0.538]
Observations 3640 3448 3569 3708 3410 3708
Adj R2 0.42 0.43 0.29 0.42 0.43
Robustness to Sample Robustness to outliers
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
The first column refers to the case where the sample is restricted to include products belonging to manufacturing industries only. The second 
column includes only those industries which were targeted by a countervailing duty imposed by Australia, Canada, EU or US in at least one of the 
products belonging to that industry. In the third column we use 1996 as the pre-accession year for data on tariffs as well as exports. The fourth 
column reports form median regression. In the fifth column we drop observations identified as being associated with an outlier based on the Hadi 
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criterion.  Finally, the sixth regression includes dummy variables that indicate whether the export value falls between the 33rd and 66th percentile 
(Mid-Total-Exports), or above the 66th percentile (Hi-Total-Exports). 
1. China's total exports to Australia, Canada, EU and US. 2. An indicator that takes the value one for those observations with the export values lying 
between 33rd and 66th percentile, and zero otherwise. 3. Indicator variable with value one if the exports lie above the 66th percentile and zero 




Variable Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source/Description
Product level -
CVD   --- 5442 0.13 0.34 0 1 Own calculation using notifications to WTO and government publications
Tariff 1996 4989 23.73 16.79 0.00 121.60 Applied ad valorem tariffs in China from TRAINS
Tariff 1999 4989 17.18 12.20 0.00 121.60 "
Tariff 2000 4972 17.03 12.21 0.00 121.00 "
Tariff 2003 5027 11.33 8.03 0.00 68.00 "
Change in tariff1   --- 4685 -5.70 7.07 -111.60 45.00 Calculated as Chinese Tariff in 2003 - Tariff in 2000
Export to the world 1996 4767 0.31 1.15 0.00 27.89 China's exports to the rest of the world from COMTRADE
Export to the world 1999 4801 0.40 1.58 0.00 47.99 in 100 million USD
Export to Sample Partners 1996 4038 0.12 0.58 0.00 15.15 China's exports to selected partner countries from COMTRADE
Export to Sample Partners 1999 4153 0.19 0.96 0.00 36.97 in 100 million USD
Industry level
Total output 1999 4433 365.90 190.23 16.46 704.22 Various Issues of China Statistical Yearbook
Total output 1996 4655 322.25 181.04 0.72 570.32 in 100 million USD
Number of firms 1999 4433 7.31 3.81 0.08 14.37 Various Issues of China Statistical Yearbook
Number of firms 1996 4655 20.41 12.08 0.13 61.89 in 1000 units
Share of state owned enterprises 1999 4433 40.84 18.43 6.49 99.86 Calculated as (value added of total industry / value added of state owned enterprises)*100
Share of state owned enterprises 1996 4655 34.13 17.52 6.23 98.09 from China Statistical Yearbook (various issues)
Capital labor ratio 1999 4433 3.01 1.14 0.58 8.64 Calculated as (total assets / employment) in the industry
Capital labor ratio 1996 4655 1.59 0.63 0.26 5.40 from China Statistical Yearbook (various issues)
Labor productivity 1999 4433 2.16 0.82 0.19 5.79 Calculated as (total output / employment) in the industry
Labor productivity 1996 4655 1.24 0.44 0.19 4.40 from China Statistical Yearbook (various issues)
ln(Import from rest of the world) 1999 4883 -3.65 2.68 -15.05 3.84 log of China's exports from the rest of the world aggregated at Chinese two digit industry
ln(Import from rest of the world) 1996 4854 -3.82 2.70 -18.42 3.55 from COMTRADE
Wage 2002 4653 1257.06 303.14 592.27 2867.63 per annum in USD from China Labor Yearbook (2003)
 
 
Table 3.A1: Data Appendix - Source and Explanations 
 
1 In the counterfactual exercise we also use change in tariffs between 1997 and 2000 which is calculated in a similar way. 
 
 
   
Table 3.A2: First Stage Regression to Get Predicted Probability  
Dependent Variable = CVD
Food Processing 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.105*** 3.436***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.014] [0.528]
Food Manufacturing 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.112*** 2.315***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.015] [0.371]
Beverage Manufacturing 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.084*** 3.715***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.036] [1.645]
Textile Industry 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.184*** 4.185***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.010] [0.330]
Garments and Other Fiber Products 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.118*** 1.822***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.010] [0.212]
Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.328*** 7.165***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.046] [1.083]
Furniture Manufacturing 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.147*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.148]
Papermaking and Paper Products 0.000 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.068***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.068]
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.314***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.063]
Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 0.003** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.022*** 0.797
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.009] [0.348]
Chemical Fiber 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.036*** 1.005
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.009] [0.259]
Rubber Products 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.035*** 0.703
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.013] [0.260]
Plastic Products 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.042*** 0.969
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.014] [0.341]
Nonmetal Mineral Products 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.058*** 1.445*
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.010] [0.277]
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.133*** 0.136*** 0.085*** 0.153*** 1.851*** 19.428***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.107] [1.761]
Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.068*** 1.911***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.011] [0.343]
Metal Products 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.024*** 0.476***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.102]
Ordinary Machinery 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.022*** 0.540***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.108]
Special Purpose Equipment 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.027*** 0.912
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.218]
Transport Equipment 0.002** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.328***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.136]
Electric Equipment and Machinery 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.012*** 0.134***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.068]
Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery0.001*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.179***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.070]
Other manufacturing 0.000 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.026***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.026]
herfindahl - share of exporters using import values 0.003*** 0.030***
[0.001] [0.003]






Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 130988 130988 127196 130988 130988 127196
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.07




Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Only those industry dummies were included for which at least one product was hit by a CVD duty in 
the past. Odds ratios reported in the case of Logit. 
jictjicttcijict WCVD εθϖϖπ ++++=  ; where, iπ  = ii I∗ϖ where iϖ  is the full set of industry 




   
Table 3.A3: Correlation between the Industry Coefficients from First 
Stage Regressions 
Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3 Eq 4 Eq 5 Eq 6 Eq 7 Eq 8 Eq 9 Eq 10
Eq 1 1
Eq 2 0.9999 1
Eq 3 0.9792 0.9802 1
Eq 4 0.9999 1.0000 0.9802 1
Eq 5 0.9790 0.9801 0.9998 0.9801 1
Eq 6 0.9996 0.9993 0.9734 0.9993 0.9732 1
Eq 7 0.9912 0.9902 0.9472 0.9901 0.9465 0.9946 1
Eq 8 0.9896 0.9899 0.9885 0.9899 0.9889 0.9861 0.9693 1
Eq 9 0.9919 0.9909 0.9487 0.9908 0.9480 0.9951 1.0000 0.9704 1
Eq 10 0.9898 0.9901 0.9883 0.9902 0.9887 0.9864 0.9698 1.0000 0.9708 1
 
 
Simple correlation between the coefficients (odds ratio for Logit) from alternative first stage 
regressions. 
Eq1-Eq5 = Coefficients from Linear Probability; Eq6-Eq10 = Odds Ratios from corresponding Logit 
Specifications. Dependent Variable = CVD (varies by product, time, country). Takes value 1 if one of 
the four countries imposed a countervailing duty for that product in that year. Regressors included: Eq1 
= industry dummies only, Eq2 = Eq1+ country and year dummy, Eq3 = Eq2+ Number of exporters, 
Herfindahl index of exporters, growth of imports, square(growth of imports),  Eq4 = Eq2+yr*ctry 






ISIC3 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
111 15.20 15.07 10.16 13.27 -5.60 8.58 -7.53 9.19
113 4.47 6.64 5.53 6.44 -0.42 0.91 -0.63 1.17
121 7.81 9.18 5.18 5.90 -2.49 3.92 -3.62 4.31
122 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -- --
130 25.77 10.85 22.50 15.94 -5.15 10.41 -5.41 10.62
210 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -- --
220 3.07 3.06 1.92 2.46 -1.67 2.66 -2.50 3.00
230 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -- --
290 0.62 1.21 0.55 1.10 -0.07 0.26 -0.23 0.44
311 20.60 13.72 20.94 34.18 -0.34 29.93 -0.37 31.09
313 19.31 11.62 8.57 7.97 -10.42 11.55 -11.04 11.60
314 25.63 6.21 21.25 3.31 -4.38 3.96 -4.38 3.96
321 8.18 4.12 8.00 3.49 -0.09 1.20 -0.09 1.22
Tariff in 2000 Tariff in 2003 Change in Tariffs Change in Tariffs1
Table 4.1: Average Tariff in Taiwan - Three Digit ISIC rev.2. 
322 13.07 2.17 12.01 1.65 -1.08 0.94 -1.08 0.94
323 4.92 4.00 4.11 3.51 -0.53 0.95 -0.57 0.97
324 5.36 1.93 5.40 1.95 0.07 0.18 0.08 0.19
331 3.53 4.33 2.44 3.84 -1.10 1.02 -1.61 0.83
332 7.67 2.13 4.67 2.53 -3.00 1.82 -3.00 1.82
341 5.04 2.74 2.30 1.21 -2.77 1.61 -3.03 1.43
342 3.96 4.46 1.78 2.02 -2.19 2.45 -4.22 1.67
351 3.49 2.30 3.25 1.85 -0.25 0.98 -0.27 1.02
352 4.09 3.70 2.84 2.59 -1.25 2.02 -1.97 1.94
353 3.47 2.08 2.99 1.74 -0.38 0.61 -0.38 0.61
354 3.75 3.95 2.77 2.78 -0.98 1.26 -0.98 1.26
355 8.79 3.67 8.19 2.95 -0.61 1.04 -0.62 1.04
356 4.94 1.31 4.73 1.41 -0.20 0.57 -0.21 0.58
361 10.04 2.87 8.97 2.13 -1.06 0.81 -1.06 0.81
362 8.23 5.09 7.10 4.23 -1.14 1.82 -1.16 1.83
369 7.26 3.42 6.72 3.25 -0.53 0.90 -0.56 0.92
371 6.91 3.64 3.68 2.56 -2.85 1.95 -3.40 1.63
372 2.34 2.90 1.77 2.36 -0.62 0.72 -1.05 0.65
381 7.90 3.10 6.85 3.01 -1.03 1.38 -1.04 1.39
382 4.60 2.66 3.36 2.13 -1.23 1.27 -1.32 1.27
383 5.98 5.19 5.17 4.41 -0.75 1.18 -0.93 1.24
384 11.92 10.85 12.98 15.59 1.04 8.23 1.30 9.18
385 4.01 2.74 3.27 2.53 -0.72 1.09 -0.85 1.14
390 5.10 3.16 4.36 3.01 -0.65 1.18 -0.76 1.25
410 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
999 1.80 2.66 1.22 2.18 -0.29 0.56 -0.83 0.68
Total 7.70 8.08 6.66 11.22 -1.06 8.12 -1.22 8.68  
 
Simple average of the six digit HS tariff data from TRAINS. Change in tariffs (Tariff2003-Tariff2000). 
1. Data with zero tariffs in 2000 were dropped before taking averages. 
Source: Authors calculation 
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Table 4.2: Effect of Probability of Retaliation on Change in Tariff 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 2003 - Tariff 2000) (OLS)
1 (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)2 (IV)1,3 (IV)3,4
CVD   0.902** 1.107*** 1.111*** 0.883* 1.171*** 1.009***
[0.354] [0.328] [0.333] [0.526] [0.380] [0.381]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.121*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.197*** -0.132** -0.089
[0.043] [0.029] [0.031] [0.028] [0.063] [0.058]
Positive tariffs -0.045
[0.186]
Constant -0.172 0.076 0.111*** -2.382*** -0.153 -0.46
[0.225] [0.164] [0.031] [0.604] [0.514] [0.458]
Observations 4518 4461 4461 4461 4346 4513
Adj R2 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02
Shea Partial R2 0.176 0.144
Test of Excluded Instrument, p 0.000 0.000  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Centered R2 reported in case of IV regression. 
1. Uses the pre-accession tariff for 1999 for comparison with China case. All other regressions have 1992 tariffs as the  
2. Includes Industry dummies  (ISIC 3 digit) 
3. Instrumented variable: pre-accession tariff (tariff in Taiwan for 1999). Instrument Used: Average tariff for the year of pre-accession tariff (1999) 
in four developing countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa)  
4. Instruments for 1996 tariff as pre-accession tariff. 
The test of excluded instruments reports the test for relevance of the instruments in the corresponding first stage regression. The associated value for 
the first IV regression reported in the table is F(1, 4343) = 586.19 and that for the second IV regression is F(1, 4510) = 788.09. Additionally in both 
cases both the Anderson-canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test statistic and the Cragg-Donald statistics suggest that the equation is identified 
(p-val 0.00). The first stage centered R2 is 0.18 and 0.15. Note that the Shea partial R2 reported above is the same as the squared partial correlation 
between the excluded instruments and the endogenous regressor when there is a single endogenous regressor.  
 
   
 
Table 4.3: Counterfactual 1 – Using Pre-Accession Sample 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 1999 - Tariff 1996) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (IV)2
CVD   -0.003 0.005 0.011 0.005
[0.054] [0.055] [0.076] [0.052]
Pre-accession tariff   0.009 0.010 0.018** 0.012
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.011]
Positive tariffs -0.086*
[0.046]
Constant -0.034 0.031* 0.007 -0.064
[0.035] [0.018] [0.277] [0.081]
Observations 4469 4469 4469 4300
Adj R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shea Partial R2 0.175
Test of Excluded Instrument, p 0.00  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Centered R2 reported in case of IV regression. 
1. Includes Industry dummies (ISIC 3 digit) 
2. Instrumented variable: pre-accession tariff (tariff in Taiwan for 1996) Instrument Used: Average 
tariff for the year of tariff in four developing countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa) for 
the year 1996. 
The test of excluded instruments reports the test for relevance of the instruments in the corresponding 
first stage regression. The associated value for the IV regression reported in the table is F(1, 4297) = 
526.79. Additionally both the Anderson-canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test statistic and the 
Cragg-Donald statistics suggest that the equation is identified (p-val 0.00). The first stage centered R2 
is 0.18. Note that the Shea partial R2 reported above is the same as the squared partial correlation 
between the excluded instruments and the endogenous regressor when there is a single endogenous 
regressor.  
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Table 4.4: Counterfactual 2 – Using Average Change in Tariffs for 
Similar Countries during the Sample Period (2000-2003) 
 
Dependent Variable =                                      
(Tariff 2003 - Tariff 2000) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (OLS)2
CVD   1.107*** 1.518*** -0.623*** 0.012
[0.328] [0.529] [0.087] [0.049]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.168*** -0.166*** -0.020*** 0.008*
[0.029] [0.034] [0.005] [0.004]
Change in Average tariffs of 0.218 -0.001
BRA,IDN,IND,ZAF [0.337] [0.008]
Constant 0.076 0.454 -1.667*** -0.030
[0.164] [0.497] [0.040] [0.024]
Observations 4461 4122 4294 4131
Adj R2 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1. For this column the dependent variable is Change in Average tariffs of Brazil, Indonesia, India and 
South Africa between 2000 and 2003 and the pre-accession tariff is the average tariff in 1999 for these 
countries 
2. Here the dependent variable is change in tariff of Taiwan between 1996 and 1999 (for comparison 
with the pre-accession counterfactual) 
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Table 4.5a: Effect of Probability of Retaliation on Change in Tariff - 
Sample Restricted to Products for which the Tariffs did not Decline 
During the Sample Period (2000-2003) 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 2003 - Tariff 2000) (Tobit)
1 (Tobit) (Tobit)2 (Tobit)
CVD   11.233*** 8.410*** 6.151*** 8.998***
[1.938] [1.373] [1.616] [1.382]
Pre-accession tariff   1.546*** 1.156*** 0.984*** 1.133***
[0.107] [0.081] [0.096] [0.082]
Change in Average tariffs of 1.705***
BRA,IDN,IND,ZAF [0.365]
Constant -33.441*** -24.007*** -24.324*** -20.464***
[1.517] [1.095] [3.635] [1.253]
Observations 2040 2010 2010 1861
Adj R2 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05  
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Pseudo R2 reported in case of tobit regression. 
1. Uses the pre-accession tariff for 1999 for comparison with the China case. All other regressions 
have 1992 tariffs as pre-accession tariff. 
2. Includes industry dummies (ISIC 3 digit) 
 
Table 4.5b: Counterfactual for the Effect of Probability of Retaliation 
on Change in Tariff - Sample Restricted to Products for which the 
Tariffs did not Decline During the Sample Period (1999-1996) 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 1999 - Tariff 1996) (Tobit) (Tobit)
1
CVD   -0.852 1.011
[1.617] [2.156]





Adj R2 0.02 0.09  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 1. 
Includes industry dummies (ISIC 3 digit). Pseudo R2 reported in case of Tobit regression. 
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Table 4.6: Effect of Probability of Retaliation on Change in Tariff – 
Robustness Tests 
 
Dependent Variable =                      
(Tariff 2003 - Tariff 2000) (OLS) (OLS)
1 (OLS) (OLS)2 (OLS)3
CVD   1.194*** 0.574** 1.101*** 0.813** 1.129***
[0.325] [0.252] [0.329] [0.326] [0.336]
Pre-accession tariff   -0.156*** -0.161*** -0.170*** -0.103*** -0.170***





Constant -0.411* -0.109 0.141 -0.256 0.079
[0.229] [0.188] [0.166] [0.216] [0.185]
Observations 4461 4461 4461 4114 3764
Adj R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.05  
 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1. Includes Industry dummies  (ISIC 3 digit) 
2. Sample restricted to only products belonging to the Manufacturing Sector 
3. Sample restricted to products belonging to only those ISIC-3 digit industries which had a 
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